透過您的圖書館登入
IP:3.233.221.42
  • 學位論文

美國單極體系為何未遭制衡? 中國合秩序性崛起個案研究

Why Is the US's Unipolar System Still Left Unbalanced? - A Case Study On China's World Order Confirming Rise to Power

指導教授 : 徐斯勤
若您是本文的作者,可授權文章由華藝線上圖書館中協助推廣。

摘要


冷戰結束後,美國成為唯一世界霸權,其絕對優勢基於四柱歷史繼承:軍事優勢、經濟制度和理念的全球化、軍事聯盟的全球網絡以及合乎美國利益的現狀。 依照新現實主義和權力平衡理論,美國霸權必然增加結構性的反抗誘因,使得其他強權制衡美國。據該兩理論,中國是最有可能制衡美國的新興強權,原因在於中國三十年以來的經濟發展所帶動的軍事力量之崛起、政治野心之擴張以及能源需求之增加等因素。 但是,為了解釋制衡現象,即使傳統理論著重於結構與區域變數例如軍事力量、威脅以及區域社會建構,它們卻不重視外國勢力抑制國家核心利益對於制衡的影響。結果,它們無法提供一個令人滿足的解釋,在中美關係因軍事和經貿議題可能引起爭執的情況下,為何中國仍只面對制衡美國的輕微誘因。 本論文藉由假說產生途徑,提出制衡在國家利益和國家行為不同層次上具有關連性。據此兩假說,本論文進行若干中美關係可能發生衝突的個案研究,並特別針對那些給予中方制衡美國的最佳理由的個案深入探討。 本研究得到兩項結論:一是,目前為止,中國最關心的核心利益包含國家主權、領土完整、政權穩定、經濟發展和區域參與。二是,在既有解釋制衡的那套變數中,可以加上第四種變數,即利益變數,使得解釋制衡更為圓滿。 本論文提出兩種值得玩味的研究發現:一是,當上述四項變數皆發揮顯著的影響時,制衡最有可能發生。二是,只要美國對中國的政治制度、菁英和國家整體不構成具體的軍事威脅,以及只要中國的核心利益不受到侵犯時,中國將不會制衡美國,無論美國的軍事力量多大或兩國之間有何種社會建構。

並列摘要


After the end of the Cold War, the US stood alone at the pinnacle of world power, resting on four historical legacies: military supremacy, globalization of its economic institutions and ideals, a global network of alliances, and a status quo beneficial to US interests. According to Neorealism and the Balance of Power theory, the supremacy of US power gives rise to systemic incentives for other powers to balance against it. According to these two theories, China is the state that is most likely to balance the US due to its rising military power, growing political aspirations and increasing energy needs, all of which are results of China's economic rise over the last three decades. Yet, as traditional theories focus on systemic and regional variables like power, threat and regional social construction to explain balancing, they fail to appreciate the effects that the restraints of national interests place on balancing. As a result, they fall short in providing a satisfactory explanation as to why China is faced with only weak incentives to balance the US, even in light of potential conflicts over military and trade related issues. This thesis employs a hypothesis-generating approach, assuming that balancing is related to national interests and different levels of state action. According to the hypothesis, several cases of potential conflict in Sino-US relations are examined, focusing on those cases which would give China the most reason to balance the US. Two conclusions can be drawn: first, for the time being, China is mostly concerned with areas of national interest, including the protection of her sovereignty, territorial unity, survival of the elite, economic growth and regional integration; second, a fourth variable, the interest variable, can be added to the set of variables whichexplain balancing. This thesis presents two noteworthy findings: first, balancing is most likely to occur when all four variables play a significant role; second, that as long as China's basic interests are not violated and as long as the US does not pose any other direct military threat to the survival of China's state system, its elite or to China as a nation, China will not balance the US, regardless of the size and strength of the US military or the social construction between the two countries.

參考文獻


寇健文,2004,《中共菁英政治的演變:制度化與權力轉柞移1978-2004》,台北:五南。
彼得 • 卡贊斯坦(Peter Katzenstein),2007(2005),《地區構成的世界》(A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium),譯者:秦亞青,魏玲,北京:北京大學。
石之瑜,2005,《社會科學知識新論: 文化研究立場十評》,台北市: 台大。
蕭全政,2004,〈論中共的「和平崛起」〉,《政治科學論叢》,(23): 1-30。
Art, Robert J., Brooks, Stephen G., Wohlforth, William C., Liebers, Keir A., and Alexander, Gerard.

被引用紀錄


許進堯(2011)。從建構主義觀點探討馬政府的國家安全戰略與政策〔碩士論文,淡江大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6846%2fTKU.2011.01221

延伸閱讀