中國大陸中央銀行獨立性的政治經濟分析：一個官僚部門競爭途徑之研究

The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence in China: A Bureaucratic Competition Approach

曾秀琳(Xiu-Lin Zeng)

指導教授 ： 陶儀芬

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/政治學研究所/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2009.10187

摘要

本篇論文從中央銀行獨立性概念出發，試圖重建中國人民銀行在金融體制改革過程中，其中央銀行獨立性建立與發展的歷史軌跡
，並以官僚體制部門間的政策競爭模式，釐清人民銀行在中國的金融政策領域中，與財政部和國家發展與改革委員會之間的競爭與合作關係，同時點出中國國有金融資產因存在監管主體多元所導致的監管政策衝突問題。

本文討論中國人民銀行自一九九三年金融體制改革以來的獨立性發展情形，並將一九九三年到二〇〇八年共十六年的時間劃分為三個階段進行討論：第一階段從一九九三年到一九九七年止，這段時期主要是人民銀行建立與強化中央銀行獨立性的初始階段，由於一九九五年《中國人民銀行法》的正式頒佈，賦予人民銀行作為中國中央銀行的法定地位，並使人民銀行正式與財政切割，不再為國家財政赤字負責，同時也藉由政策性銀行的成立，徹底剝離人民銀行的政策性信貸功能；第二階段是一九九八年到二〇〇二年人民銀行強化中央領導能力時期，這段期間人民銀行改革其內部組織管理機構，廢除原先的省級分行而改行九大區行，目的在強化中央銀行的領導能力，擺脫地方政府的政治干預，並且奠定往後金融分業監管的基礎；第三階段從二〇〇三年算起到二〇〇八年止，隨銀行業監督管理委員會的成立，人民銀行正式完成監管分離的目標，加以《中國人民銀行法》的修正更加明確人民銀行的首要目標在於穩定金融，因而使人民銀行作為中國中央銀行之角色更為確定且受法律保障。

在這三個階段中，筆者各提出一個案例：一九九四年政策性銀行的成立、一九九九年四大國有金融資產管理公司的設立，以及二〇〇三年運作外匯存底創設的中央匯金投資有限責任公司，分別說明這些金融機構的設立對於人民銀行提高其央行獨立性之助益，同時也點出中國國有金融資產所面臨的監管主體多元又複雜之問題，由於人民銀行、財政部、國發改委以及三會（銀監會、保監會與證監會）之間所關注的利益不同，導致彼此對於監管政策的看法發生歧異，因而產生監管政策上的衝突，這將不利於監管職能的貫徹，甚至可能產生潛在的金融風險。

儘管人民銀行的中央銀行獨立性已獲得顯著提升，但卻存在法定獨立性與實際獨立性有極大落差的問題，加以人民銀行須在國務院的領導下制訂與執行貨幣政策，使得人民銀行缺乏政策制訂的自主性。正因如此，未來人民銀行的改革方向，應將重點放在強化人民銀行貨幣政策制訂的獨立性，並且主動公開更多政策信息與統計數據，藉以提高人民銀行的政策透明度，使民眾產生合理預期，才能利於其央行獨立性的提升與整體金融之穩定。

關鍵字

中央銀行獨立性 ； 官僚競爭 ； 金融改革 ； 監管分離 ； 貨幣政策

並列摘要

This thesis attempts to expound the concept of central bank independence (CBI) in China. By using the bureaucratic competition approach, the writer tries to reconstruct the developmental path of the People’s Bank of China (PBC) in the financial reform era from 1993 to 2008. As the central bank in China, the PBC strives to increase the degrees of CBI to ensure the stability of financial system. While the PBC expands its political influence and improves the degrees of CBI, it must face the competition of financial policy with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).

By dividing the sixteen years into three periods, the raise of CBI in China is remarkable. In the first period (1993-1997), the PBC commenced to build and to strengthen the CBI. Through the enacted of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China in 1995, the PBC separated from the financial control of MOF, and was confirmed to be the central bank of China in formal. The establishment of the three policy-oriented banks in 1994, freed the PBC from the burden of policy loans as well.

In the second period (1998-2002), in order to get rid of the interference from local governments, the PBC reformed the inner organization to centralize the control of the PBC’s headquarter in Beijing, and laid the foundation to separate the regulatory function from the PBC. In the third period (2003-2008), when the China Government set up the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) in 2003, the PBC achieved the goal of separating the supervisory responsibility for the banking institutions, asset management companies (AMCs), trust and investment companies and other depository financial institutions. Furthermore, the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress approved the amendment to the Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China on December 27, 2003, which has strengthened the role of the PBC in making and implementation of monetary policy, in safeguarding the overall financial stability and in the provision of financial services.

In the financial reform era from 1993 to 2008, the writer cites three instances which are the establishment of the three policy-oriented banks in 1994, the instituted of the four AMCs in 1999, and the founded of the Central Huijin Investment Ltd in 2003, to illustrate the conflict of supervisal policy between the PBC, MOF and NDRC. This article concludes that although the CBI in China has been improved since 1993, the PBC still lakes the autonomy to make monetary policy without the interference of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China. So the writer suggest that in order to improve the CBI in china, the PBC should have more independence on monetary policy making, and disclose more policy messages and statistics to promote the openness of policy. Once the CBI in China has been improved both in practical and in formal, the PBC, as the central bank in China, will have more ability to ensure the financial stability and promote the economic growth in China by making and implementing monetary policy independently.

並列關鍵字

central bank independence ； bureaucratic competition ； inancial reform ； division of regulatory function ； monetary policy

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