EBITDA基礎債務條款對高階主管薪酬－現金流量敏感度之影響

The Relation Between EBITDA-Based Debt Covenants and CEO Pay Sensitivity to Cash Flows

劉伊珊(Yi-Shan Liu)

指導教授 ： 吳淑鈴

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2021年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU202101535

摘要

因應SFAS95，美國上市公司從1987年開始必須編製現金流量表，並提供來自營運活動之現金流量資訊。近年來公司本身與外部市場對於營運現金流量與營運資金的重視程度愈趨提升。薪酬契約中即經常以現金流量指標作為績效評估措施。然而，銀行債權人在設置債務條款時，仍偏好以息前稅前折舊攤銷前淨利（Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization expenses, EBITDA）衡量借款公司是否有足夠的現金流量來償還債務。本研究之研究重點在於探討EBITDA基礎之債務條款如何影響高階主管現金薪酬對於現金流量的敏感度。
本研究以1993年至2019年之美國公司作為樣本，研究發現當公司於債務合約中簽署以EBITDA為基礎之債務條款，將使CEO現金薪酬對於來自營運活動現金流量之敏感度增加。額外測試結果顯示，當年度或前一年度債務合約中包含EBITDA基礎債務條款的公司，相對於未含有EBITDA基礎債務條款的公司，更有可能在CEO薪酬契約中實際納入來自營運活動之現金流量作為績效衡量指標。綜合上述結論，本研究認為股東在評估管理者績效並制定薪酬契約時，會根據債務條款之設定調整高階管理階層績效指標的權重，除了考量會計盈餘，將同時更加重視管理者實際透過本業經營而為公司賺進現金流的能力。透過加強來自營運活動現金流量與薪酬的連結，亦能有效達到維持EBITDA穩定高於債務合約所要求的水準之上。

關鍵字

債務條款 ； 薪酬績效敏感度 ； 現金流量 ； EBITDA ； 高階管理階層

並列摘要

According to SFAS95, US firms must prepare a cash flow statement and provide cash flow information relevant to operating activities since 1987. In recent years, firms and external markets have paid more attention to operating cash flow(OCF) and working capital. Cash flow indicators are used as performance measures in CEO incentive contracts frequently. However, bank creditors still prefer to use earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization expenses (EBITDA) to gauge borrowing firms’ cash flows and their ability to repay the debt. Thus, this study investigates how EBITDA-based debt covenants affect the cash compensation sensitivity of cash flows.
Focusing on US firms with available debt covenants data from 1993 to 2019, the empirical results of this study show that changes in cash compensation are more sensitive to changes in OCF in firms subject to EBITDA-based debt covenants. In addition, this study finds that the existence of EBITDA-based debt covenants is positively associated with the prevalence of using OCF as performance indicators in CEO incentive contracts. The results suggest that EBITDA-based debt covenants make firms put more weight on OCF in executive compensation contracts and motivate CEOs to increase operating cash flows. This, in turn, can help firms to maintain EBITDA at the required level.

並列關鍵字

Debt Covenant ； Pay-Performance Sensitivity ； Cash Flow ； EBITDA ； CEO

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