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  • 學位論文

小國面對強鄰主權需索下之擺盪現象:台海及烏俄主權衝突之案例分析

The Oscillation of Small States When Confronting A Stronger Neighbor with Sovereignty Demand - The Cases of Taiwan Strait and Ukraine-Russia Relations

指導教授 : 明居正

摘要


擺盪現象在小國應對大國的學術研究當中,一直是一個描述性重於理論性的輔助概念。儘管許多研究者觀察到了擺盪現象,但是他們仍然認為,一個受到強鄰威脅的小國會依據自身與外部條件,從廣義的抗衡與扈從當中選擇一回應選項來進行應對。然而,外部環境的條件未必足夠明確,小國面臨到的狀況可能是一條件模糊的灰色地帶,這將使小國無法精準判斷自身與外部條件,從而無法採取一優勢的回應選項。本文認為,唯有將灰色地帶與擺盪現象帶入既有的小國理論當中,我們才能更精準地理解並解釋小國的應對作為,而小國戰略姿態演變模式則嘗試要完成此一任務。 小國戰略姿態演變模式認為,小國與大國的互動都可歸入共12種戰略姿態演變情境當中,而大國的威脅程度與小國所擁有的物質條件會決定小國處在怎樣的演變情境。整體而言,當大國的威脅程度越高,小國越可能採取極端選項,反之,小國越可能採取中間選項。此外,外國支持程度的高低則決定小國究竟會採取對抗型選項、讓步型選項或是在兩者間擺盪。最後,小國的經濟發展程度會影響小國受國際力量短期干預的敏感度。 1991年以後的烏克蘭與1979年以後的台灣剛好分屬兩種不同的演變情境。蘇聯崩解後,俄羅斯仍對烏克蘭懷有主權野心,但是宥於國力,只能對烏克蘭帶來低度威脅,然而,歐美在2014年以前,始終沒有對烏克蘭敞開歐盟與北約的會員資格大門,這讓經濟發展落後的烏克蘭陷於「低度威脅下的被動擺盪期」。在中共改採「和平統一」戰略方針以後,台灣就一直處在低度威脅情境當中,然而,美國也終止了《中美共同防禦條約》,經濟發展佔優的台灣因而失去美國的絕對奧援,被迫從「中度威脅下的高成本持續期」轉入「低度威脅下的主動擺盪期」。隨著中國大陸的經濟發展程度逐漸進逼,台灣未來很可能在2020年以後喪失經濟發展程度的優勢,並轉入「低度威脅下的兩可擺盪期」,屆時,美國與中共的力量將更可能介入台灣政局、台灣的擺盪頻率將會提高、台灣的政治穩定度甚至會出現衰退。

並列摘要


The oscillation of states’ behaviors has long been treated in the academic field of IR as a descriptive term rather than a theoretical concept. Many researchers are aware of the phenomenon of states’ oscillation but still choose to believe that small states confronting a stronger neighbor would accurately recognize the pertinent conditions and decisively take a strategic posture between the so-called balancing and bandwagoning. However, conditions which a small state faces are not necessarily as clear as crystal. There are some gray areas where conditions are obscure, and small states are unable to identify a preferable choice. From the viewpoint of this thesis, only when the concept of oscillation and gray areas are integrated into the existing theories can we better understand and explain the responding behaviors of small states towards a strong neighboring country. According to the “Progression of Strategic Postures” theory, small states’ response towards the strong neighbor with sovereignty demand can all be classified into twelve progression scenarios. The level of external threat posed by the strong neighbor and the level of physical resources possessed by the small state would jointly decide the progression scenario which the small state is in. In short, the higher the external threat is, the more extreme the responding options will be; conversely, the lower the external threat is, the more moderate the responding options will be. In addition, the level of foreign supports will decide which the small state will do between continuously taking confrontation-based options, continuously taking concession-based options and wavering among the afore-mentioned two options. Lastly, the level of economic development will decide the small state’s fragility of international intervention. The Ukraine case, which starts in 1991, and the Taiwan case, which starts in 1979, belong to two different progression scenarios. Russia still held sovereignty ambition towards Ukraine after the Soviet Union had been dissolved, but Russia was bounded by its weaker national power and could only pose low-level threat to Ukraine. The West, on the other hand, had not given the green light to Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership before 2014. It caused the economically disadvantaged Ukraine unable to get away from the Passive Oscillation Period of Lower Threat. Taiwan has long been under low-level threat since the PRC adopted the strategy of Peaceful Unification and under medium-level support since the USA terminated Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty. The economically prosperous Taiwan was thus forced to enter the Autonomous Progression Period of Low Threat. As the mainland China keeps growing economically at speed, Taiwan could lose the advantage of economical development and be forced to enter the Neutral Progression Period of Low Threat. At that point, the USA and the PRC will be more likely to intervene in Taiwan’s internal political process, Taiwan’s oscillation frequency will start to rise, and Taiwan’s political stability will drop.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


張逸帆(2016)。「斷腕」與「劫掠」:能力落差下的戰略抉擇──以日俄戰爭為實證案例〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342%2fNTU201603048

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