股東提案制度之檢討─以公開發行公司為討論對象

The Research on Shareholder Proposal Rules─Focusing on Public Companies

許容慈(Jung-Tzu Hsu)

指導教授 ： 蔡英欣

國立臺灣大學/法律學院/法律學研究所/碩士(2013年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2013.02089

摘要

近年來，因為金融弊案頻傳，使得公司治理中股東權之行使為各國所強調，而股東提案制度所得發揮之股東監控功能，也較以往更受到各界之重視。我國在2005年亦引進股東提案權之規定，與我國法上原有之臨時動議，為我國現行法上之股東提案制度。
然此現行法上之股東提案制度之運作成效，似乎不如預期。一方面，臨時動議在實務上屢遭濫用，另一方面，股東提案權制度卻乏人問津，從本文所整理的實證資料中，亦可看出股東提案權規範在適用上仍有許多問題存在。可見，我國現行法上之股東提案制度，實有檢討之必要。
而參看美國法上之股東提案權制度，在以董事會優位主義為中心的治理態度下，其股東提案權之提案範圍較受限制，而SEC事前介入之管理方式，亦為其制度上較為特殊之處，另外，在美國法上甚為活躍的社會性提案，亦引發國際對股東提案權制度所可能促使公司盡其社會責任之功效有所認識；英國法上之股東提案權制度，則因為其在公司治理上較偏向股東會優位主義，相當尊重公司股東之意見，其股東所得提案之範圍則有較大的彈性空間，然相對而來，其在股東提案資格以及其他形式要件上，即採取較嚴格的規範設計。
日本法上的股東提案制度，在強調「公開」之概念下，對會場上之股東提案權有所限制，就股東資訊取得之保障較為充足，值得我國借鏡；至於事前之股東提案權制度，則未有過於嚴格之要件限制，至於在股東提案範圍上，日本法上就採取股東會優位主義或董事會優位主義之態度，並未明確，然其學說上之討論，亦值得關注。
在參看比較法之規範後，本文提出幾點建議。首先，為確保股東資訊取得之權利，建議就我國法上臨時動議之範圍進行限縮，而以股東從召集通知上所得預見將於該次股東會上討論之事項為限，始得提出，將我國之股東提案制度修正為，以事前之股東提案權制度為主要提案方式，而以臨時動議為輔；另外，在股東提案範圍上，本文建議應該明文為規定，並排除董事會對超出範圍提案是否列入股東會議案中之裁量權，且在就各公司內部權限劃分傾向採取較為開放之態度下，本文所建議之股東提案範圍亦可能較為寬廣；此外，在股東提案權之適正行使上，除了就股東提案資格訂定適當門檻、並防止股東濫用外，亦強調賦予股東完整行使其提案權之空間；最後，在實效性確保機制上，建議在事前由行政機關介入，確保合法之股東提案將被列入股東會議程中，另外在事後亦應加強對董事之制裁，以收嚇阻之效。
盼能藉由上述之修正建議，使我國之股東提案制度更為完善，更能促使股東參與公司治理，發揮監督經營者之效果，讓公司朝向更符合股東全體意思之方向經營。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 股東行動主義 ； 股東民主 ； 股東提案權 ； 臨時動議 ； 股東資訊權 ； 權限劃分

並列摘要

In recent years, for the occurrence of many financial scandals, the role of shareholders in the corporate governance is emphasized by many countries. Because the shareholder proposal rules could be used as a tool to supervise the directors, the rules are taken more seriously recently. In Taiwan, shareholder proposal rules is introduced in 2005, and along with the provisional motions, are the two ways shareholders can raise proposals in Taiwan.
However, the current rules about shareholder to raise proposals didn’t work as well as expected. On one hand, the abuse of provisional motions is serious. On the other hand, shareholder proposal rules are seldom used by shareholders. We can also find many problems about shareholder proposal rules from the empirical information sorted out in this thesis. Therefore, we have to acknowledge that the current rules for shareholder raising proposals need to be examined.
In American law, due to the attitude of corporate governance prefers to the director primacy conception, the range of shareholder proposal is restricted. And the intervention before the shareholder meetings by SEC is also a special design of American shareholder proposal rules. In addition, the vibrant proposals about social issues also lead international governances to recognize the function of shareholder proposal rules that can promote corporations to do their social responsibilities. On the other hand, on the base of the attitude closing to the shareholder primacy, the corporate governance in UK takes shareholders’ opinions seriously, and the range of shareholder proposals is more flexible. Relatively, the certification of shareholders to raise proposals and other conditions for shareholder proposals are designed strictly.
In Japan, because it emphasizes the conception of “disclosure”, the provisional motions are relatively restricted. So the protection for shareholder information rights is more sufficient, and worth learning. As to the shareholder proposal rules, there are no strict restrictions in Japanese law. Although, whether the attitude of corporate governance in Japanese law closes to shareholder primacy or director primacy is not clear, the discussion in Japan is still worth to be noticed.
After the introduction of comparative laws, in this article, I will raise some suggestions for amendments of shareholder proposal rules in Taiwan. First, for protection of shareholder’s information rights, I suggest that the range of provisional motions should be restricted. Only issues, which could be expected to be dealt in the shareholder meeting from the convening notice, can be raised as a provision motion. Therefore, the shareholder proposal rules would become the main way for shareholders to raise the proposals, and the provisional motions would become just a supplementary way. Second, I suggest that the range of shareholder proposals should be drawn clearly in the corporate law, and should remove director’s discretion on whether to reject the illegal shareholder proposals. And on the foundation of open attitude about the division of power between shareholder meeting and the board of directors, I suggest the range of shareholder proposal should be more flexible. Third, as to the properly use of shareholder proposal rules, we should not only set threshold for shareholders who want to raise proposals, refrain from abuse by shareholders, but also stress the importance of offering shareholders sufficient space to raise the proposals. Fourth, for guaranteeing the effect of the shareholder proposal rules, I suggest that the government should interfere before the shareholder meetings to ensure that the companies will put the legitimate shareholder proposals in the convening notices. After the shareholder meetings, the punishment for the directors who break the law should be set more strictly.
Through the amendments mentioned in this article, I hope that the shareholder proposal rules could be more complement, and could promote shareholders to join in the corporate governance.

並列關鍵字

corporate governance ； shareholder activism ； shareholder democracy ； shareholder proposals ； provisional motion ； the allocation of power between shareholders and directors

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