盈餘基礎債務契約是否增加薪酬對盈餘下降的敏感度

Earnings-based debt covenants and the less sensitivity of cash compensation to negative earnings change

吳智穎(Chih-Ying Wu)

指導教授 ： 吳淑鈴

國立臺灣大學/管理學院/會計學研究所/碩士(2021年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU202101601

摘要

Shaw Zhang (2012)的研究指出CEO的現金薪酬不會因為欠佳的公司績效而受到懲罰，並且從現況也能觀察到，大部分的高階主管薪酬不會因為隨著公司績效欠佳而有所下降。然而，Rhodes (2016)發現盈餘基礎債務契約的使用可以重新平衡CEO現金薪酬對公司盈餘績效之敏感度。本研究以美國公司作為樣本，樣本期間從美國證券交易委員會(SEC)強制要求揭露高階主管薪酬的1992年開始至2019年，探討盈餘基礎債務契約是否能夠增加CEO現金薪酬對欠佳的公司盈餘績效之敏感度。主要實證結果顯示盈餘基礎債務契約的使用會增加CEO現金薪酬對欠佳的公司盈餘績效之敏感度。考量到以往研究指出強健的公司治理也不會改善CEO現金薪酬對欠佳的公司盈餘績效之敏感度，本研究以兩種不同的公司治理指標分群作為額外分析，結果皆顯示較健全的公司治理，輔以公司負債包含盈餘基礎債務契約，可增加CEO現金薪酬對績效欠佳的公司盈餘績效之敏感度。

關鍵字

高階主管薪酬 ； 債務契約 ； 薪酬績效敏感性 ； 公司治理 ； 誘因契約 ； 代理問題

並列摘要

Shaw Zhang (2012) indicate that CEO cash compensation is not punished for bad firm performance, and it can also be observed from the practice that most executive compensation does not decrease following the poor firm performance. My study investigates and finds that earnings-based debt covenants could increase the sensitivity of CEO cash compensation to poor earnings performance using US firms during the period 1992~2019. Although prior study shows that strong corporate governance cannot improve the cash pay sensitivity to poor earnings performance, I find the use of earnings-based debt covenants makes CEO cash compensation react more to poor earnings performance in firms with strong corporate governance. The results suggest that earnings-based covenants provide important monitoring role in executive compensation mechanism, especially in firms which face more significant earnings drops.

並列關鍵字

CEO Compensation ； Debt Covenants ； Pay-Performance Sensitivity ； Corporate Governance ； Incentive Contract ； Agency Problem

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