我國立法委員之內線交易責任

針對內線交易之規範主體，第一直覺通常為具有資訊優勢地位之公司內部人。然而，在某些特定情形，某些公司外部人相比內部人而言反而更具有資訊優勢之地位，更有受規範之必要性。以本次美國新冠肺炎疫情期間有國會議員涉嫌從事內線交易案件為例，國會議員雖為公司之外部人，然渠等獲得與疫情相關機密資訊之機會反而遠超於公司之內部人。惟針對渠等利用此類消息進行證券交易獲利之行為是否構成內線交易，主要涉及國會議員對公司或消息來源究竟是否負有「信賴義務」，美國學界就此原存有激烈爭辯，直至西元2012年制定STOCK Act後紛爭始逐漸平息。本於相同之人性，我國之立法委員同樣具有利用此類消息進行內線交易之可能。惟因我國並未如美國般特別針對國會議員制定相關專法，判斷上僅得依現行成文法規範而定，其中最可能適用者為證券交易法第157條之1第1項第3款「基於職業關係獲悉消息之人」。然因本款文義並不明確，具有相當解釋空間，判斷上不免回歸應以「市場論」或「義務論」解釋之紛爭。就此，採行「市場論」觀點固然得確保立法委員受到內線交易規範限制，然同時亦恐使其他無辜大眾受到波及，致本款成為「概括條款」，反而戕害資本效率市場之穩定運作，結論上仍應以「義務論」之思想基調為主，並藉其中之「私取理論」縮小規範漏洞之範圍。基此，以「私取理論」解釋確實有機會將我國立法委員納入規範範疇，畢竟依我國立法委員行為法，不難推導出立法委員具有忠實執行業務及不得利用職務見聞進行內線交易之戒絕義務。然有所疑義的是，美國聯邦法法院係於西元1997年始於O’Hagan案中確立「私取理論」之見解，惟我國於西元1988年制定證券交易法第157條之1時即有該條第1項第3款「基於職業關係獲悉消息之人」規定，若以其後出現之「私取理論」作為本款之解釋方法或判斷標準，援引上恐仍應設法補齊足夠之正當性。此外，我國內線交易法制在實務運作上常遭人詬病有「立法從嚴，執行從寬」之矛盾及「犯罪黑數」之負面影響，此於我國未曾出現因「立法委員」身份進行內線交易遭定罪之案例，即可為證。故本文認為可參照美國 STOCK Act相關措施，如動態申報制度等。藉以在完善內線交易法制之同時，真正在實務上有效防堵立法委員利用職務見聞進行內線交易之風險。

關鍵字

國會議員；立法委員；內部人；內線交易；私取理論；公眾信賴義務；停止利用國會見聞交易法

並列摘要

With respect to the target entity of insider trading, the first that come to mind is usually the company insider who has the advantageous information position. However, in certain circumstances, outsiders may be in a more advantageous information position than insiders and are as necessary as insiders to be regulated. For example, during the Covid-19 pandemic in the United States, although the members of Congress were outsiders to companies, they had far greater access to confidential information related to Covid-19 pandemic than company insiders. Nevertheless, whether the use of such information by members of Congress to make profits from securities transactions constitutes insider trading depends on whether they have the “fiduciary duty” to the company or the source of the information. There were heated discussions in American academia on this issue until the STOCK Act was enacted in 2012. Given human nature, it is also possible for legislators in Taiwan to abuse such information for insider trading. Since Taiwan has not enacted a specific statute for Congress members regarding insider trading, the most likely application is Article 157-1(1)(3) of the Securities and Exchange Act (“Article 157-1(1)(3)”), which states that “any person who has learned the information by reason of occupational or controlling relationship.” As the meaning of Article 157-1(1)(3) is unclear, there is a considerable room for interpretation in this subsection. It inevitably returns to the dispute of whether the interpretation should be the "Market-based Theory" or the “Relationship-based Theory.” Though the adoption of the “Market-based Theory” view can ensure that legislators are subject to insider trading regulation, it may affect the innocent public. This could make Article 157-1(1)(3) a “general provision” that undermines the stability of the capital efficiency market. Therefore, the better approach would be to interpret Article 157-1(1)(3) under the “Relationship-based Theory” and the “Misappropriation Theory.” The interpretation of Article 157-1(1)(3) under the “Misappropriation Theory”, therefore, may include company outsiders such as legislators into legal regulation. According to the Legislators Conduct Act in Taiwan, it is reasonable to infer that legislators have the obligation to faithfully execute their fiduciary duty and shall not use the information from their occupation for insider trading. However, the Supreme Court of the United States first established the “Misappropriation Theory” in 1997 in O'Hagan. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). Article 157-1(1)(3) was enacted in 1988. The time difference suggests that the legislators in Taiwan did not consider “Misappropriation Theory” in the legislation of Article 157-1(1)(3). If the “Misappropriation Theory” is used as an approach to interpret Article 157-1(1)(3), we should seek the legitimacy of this interpretation. In addition, the practice of the legal mechanism of insider trading in Taiwan is often criticized for “strict legislation and lax enforcement” and the negative impact of “the hidden figure of crime.” This is evidenced by the fact that there have never been cases of convictions for insider trading for legislators in Taiwan. Therefore, this thesis believes that we can refer to the relevant measures of the U.S. STOCK Act, such as its disclosure system, etc. In this way, while improving the insider trading legal system, we can effectively prevent the risk of insider trading by legislators learning information by reason of occupational or controlling relationship.