我國政府長久以來捐助眾多財團法人協助推動公共事務,歷經多年仍未統一建立相關之監督管理辦法,再加上行政部門監督不彰,導致財團法人弊端叢生。如依國際貨幣基金(the International Monetary Fund簡稱IMF)定義之政府部門,應包括所有政府單位,及主要提供非市場服務並由政府部門控制和提供資金的非營利機構。觀諸國際間對財團法人等非營利組織之定位,我國之公設財團法人之定位與監督方式,實值得探討。 本研究以代理人理論之研究途徑,探討人民、官僚體系、立法委員及公設財團法人間的委託與代理關係。透過瞭解公設財團法人的現況,以及公設財團法人與主管機關的委託代理關係,進一步分析目前行政監督不彰之因素。由於行政部門監督效能不彰,致使民意透過委託方式,將對公設財團法人的監督權直接略過行政部門,委由立法院代為監督。因此,本研究對立法院監督公設財團法人之正當性加以分析,並審視立法院審議公設財團法人98年度預算情形,針對審議過程、審議發生之監督成本及審議結果逐一探討。再採以對立法委員、行政部門、學者及公設財團法人經營者等人透過訪談方式取得產、官、學界對於立法院監督公設財團法人之多方意見與見解。 本研究有幾點發現,第一,立法院對公設財團法人之預算審議權具有正當性。第二,因具有正當性之監督,故其監督方式由「事前」間接監督及「事後」直接監督,轉變成「事前與事後」之「直接」監督。第三,以預算審議權進行監督之過程,仍存有諸多不完備之處,包括預算法條文欠缺明確性、預算法所訂之適用標準不符監督效益、不同規模之公設財團法人受相同程度之監督不符比例原則、預算籌編、審議及執行相關配套措施不足。最後,透過立法院審議預算已達初步資訊之公開等事項。 本研究有幾點政策建議,首先,應檢討公設財團法人業務予以整併或轉型。再者,預算法宜以一固定金額下限作為監督公設財團法人之標準及預算籌編等相關預算規定應全盤考量。另外,對於公設財團法人資訊公開部分宜再加強。最後,應儘速制定財團法人專法,並就立法院以預算審議權對公設財團法人進行監督之過渡方式宜訂時間表。
To promote its public polices, our Government has been consistently donated funds to all kinds of NPOs for quite a while. Operated after all these years, a lot of malpractices originated from the system. This outcome can be attributed to two main factors, lack of uniform regulations regarding NPOs’ supervision and administration is one, and executive departments play comparatively weak roles as supervisors is the other. According to the IMF’s definition on so called “government”, any governmental agencies or non-profit organizations, which provide non-profit oriented services as well as either controlled or sponsored by government, should be included. Based on how NPOs were defined among countries, an overall review of that part under our legal system somewhat is imminent and necessary. The core of this thesis is to research the entrusted agency relationship exists among people, bureaucratic system, legislators and GONGOs on the basis of “Principal-Agent Theory”. Moreover, further analyze on what costs governmental agencies’ insufficient supervision through the understanding of GONGOs’ current situation and the entrusted agency relationship between both GONGOs and authorities concerned. Ignored executive departments, people chose to mandate the Legislative Yuan, as executive departments’ proxy in terms of over sighting GONGOs, due to the latters’ poor performance. This research accordingly will be focus on the accountability of the Legislative Yuan’s oversight over all GONGOs. In addition, look into the whole situation of GONGOs’ 2009 budget reviewed by the Legislative Yuan. It will be stated by several parts; the reviewing process, the costs assumed during the reviewing period, and the final result achieved eventfully. The findings of this thesis found are as follows: First, it’s no doubt that the Legislative Yuan has absolute power to oversight GONGOs. Secondly, its role towards supervising GONGOs has change dramatically from either “prior & indirect”or “ex-post & direct” to both “both & ex-post” and “direct”. Third, there are still deficiencies have to be improved in terms of the current budgetary reviewing system; such as, the Budget law itself is not explicit enough, related standard does not meet oversight efficacy original proposed, it’s not proportionate to apply the same ceiling to supervise GONGOs which have different scales, and coordinating measures as how to prepare, review or enforce budgets, are inadequate. The last is it can be concluded that the budgetary reviewing process applied by the Legislative Yuan only reaches the early stage of disclosing GONGOs information. In conclusion, this thesis suggests that GONGOs structures need to be reformed by either merging or transforming process. Furthermore, the Budget Law should set up certain amount of budgets as a minimum standard in order to supervise GONGOs, also the part relating how to prepare budgets apparently should have an overall consideration. As far as the disclosure of information, comprehensive measures should be taken to reinforce. Finally, a special law of GONGOs and the timetable of transitional oversighting measures applied by the Legislative Yuan should be introduced as soon as possible.