本研究將探討美國公司總部所在州通過Wrongful Discharge Laws(WDLs),為一個保護員工不被隨意開除之法案,對於公司盈餘管理程度之影響。本研究將利用通過WDLs作為提升員工保護的準自然實驗,並利用Dechow-Dichev (2002)之模型衡量盈餘管理,作為被解釋變數,研究通過WDLs後員工受到不被隨意開除之保護對於公司盈餘管理程度之影響。本研究發現公司總部所在州通過WDLs後,經理人因為不需要擔心沒有達到盈餘目標會被開除而減弱進行盈餘管理的動機、公司的利害關係人監管以及內部監管增強,公司避免美化盈餘以及減少避稅活動,因此公司盈餘管理程度會顯著下降。
This study exploits the adoption of U.S. state-level Wrongful Discharge Laws (WDLs) as a quasi-exogenous increase in employee protection to examine how the pass of WDLs affects firms' earnings management. This study uses the Dechow-Dichev (2002) model to measure the degree of earnings management. This study finds a significant decline in earnings management for firms located in states that increase employee protection. The reason for the decline is that managers will have lower incentives to do earnings management because of being better protected from being fired due to underperforming earnings. Furthermore, earnings management will decline since firms might face stricter stakeholder supervision and avoid earnings adjustments and tax aggressiveness after the adoption of WDLs.
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