論為害與允害區分之道德意涵

On The Moral Significance of Doing Harm/Allowing Harm Distinction

黃芝盈(Chih-Ying Huang)

指導教授 ： 孫效智

國立臺灣大學/文學院/哲學研究所/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2007.10479

摘要

摘 要
「即使傷害一人是救其他人唯一的方法，我們仍認為傷害無辜的行為比起聽任人受傷更應受到譴責」。這樣的觀念，在日常倫理觀中，似乎是不容置疑且相當普遍的看法。這不僅可以在法律與宗教的思維中發現，更反映在當代醫學倫理的決策與討論中。然而，即使如此，仍有許多倫理學者質疑造成傷害和聽任傷害之間，意即為害和允害之間是道德相關的區分，並否定這區分是一項在規範層次上與道德相關的規範因素。
本篇論文的目的即是要探討，為害與允害是否是一項能參與決定行為道德狀態的區分。文分為三大部分進行：
首先，便是要探問如何定義的問題。思考如何能適當的區分為害與允害？應該採取什麼樣的判準來表述為害與允害的區別，以期能符合日常語言的使用？其二，則是在確立區分判準後，針對幾則反駁這區分具道德意涵的案例進行剖析，說明反例所引發的相關爭論與論點。第三部分則關注為害與允害區分的證成問題。指出這區分具有道德意涵可能訴諸的原由與根據，以及這些理由是否足以支持與為害和允害這區分在道德上的意涵。文末指出，為害與允害的區分雖然在適當地理解與有限條件下具有道德意涵，但卻不足以支持為害行為成為「為害限制」、形成凌越結果考量的規範因素。

關鍵字

為害 ； 允害 ； 殺人 ； 聽任死亡 ； 道德意涵

並列摘要

In commonsense morality, it seems to be an undeniable and widespread view that doing harm to the innocent is more reprehensible than merely allowing harm, even if harming one individual is the only way to save many others from being harmed. Such a belief is not only reflected in our law and religious thought, but also in many discourses of contemporary medical ethics. There are, however, many ethicists who call into question that the distinction between doing harm and allowing harm is morally significant, and argue against it as a normative factor that possesses moral relevance at the normative level.
The main purpose of this thesis is to undertake this controversial issue, to discuss whether the doing harm/allowing harm distinction is relevant to the determination of the moral status of actions. This thesis can be divided into three parts to elucidate:
The first one of the central aims is to ask how to adequately distinguish doing harm from allowing harm, that is, to inquire what criterion should be adopted to characterize the distinction which can correspond with our ordinary linguistic usage. The second point will be to analyze some cases constructed to refute the assumption that this distinction makes a difference in moral assessment, and to illustrate the relevant disputes and arguments arising from those counterexamples. The third is concerned with the justification for this distinction’s moral significance. To find out how one justifies the moral relevance of this distinction, we will undertake some probable reasons, from which this assumption is derived, to examine whether those reasons are satisfactory to defend that doing harm is morally worse than allowing harm.
In conclusion, I point out that through proper interpretation of “moral significance”, the doing harm/allowing harm distinction is conditionally justified as morally relevant, but it is not strong enough to support “doing harm” to become a “constraint against doing harm”, a normative factor outweighing the promotion of good.

並列關鍵字

Doing harm ； Allowing harm ； killing ； letting die ； moral significance

參考文獻

Steinbock, Bonnie and Norcross, Alastair ed. Killing and Letting Die, Fordham University Press, 1994.

Bennett, Jonathan. ”Morality and Consequences,” The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, second edited by Sterling McMurrin, Cambridge:Cambridge University press, 1981：45-166.

Chandler, John. ”Killing and Letting Die—Putting the Debate in Context,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 68 ,1990：420-31.

Cartwright, Will. ”Killing and Letting die: a Defensible Distinction,” British Medical Bulletin. 52, 2 ,1996：354-61.

Dinello, Daniel. “On Killing and Letting Die,” in Analysis, 31 ,1971：84-86.