美國對中關係正常化偏差動員之研究，1969-1979

The Study on the Mobilization of Bias in the U.S. Policy of Normalization toward the PRC, 1969-1979

郭大文(Tah-Wen Kuo)

指導教授 ： 蕭全政

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/政治學研究所/博士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2014.03061

摘要

造物者沒有給人類永不匱乏的玫瑰園。人類經過不斷爭奪、分配及利用有限資源，發展出組織與制度的政經模式以解決各種問題。對蘇聯崛起所隱含對美國霸權在全球對抗的變局，美國尼克森總統透過組織制度啟動多極體制相互制衡與權力平衡的概念；從主張親中和蘇、執行秘密穿梭外交、兩個中國與簽定「上海公報」，期望美中關係能夠正常化，達到美中建交的終極目標；福特總統亦透過組織制度施展美中蘇三極平衡概念，以減少水門案重創共和黨政府威信與因中蘇關係緩和而延緩的「美中關係正常化」之進程；卡特總統對於蘇聯積極擴張所隱含對美國全球戰略威脅日趨嚴重，也急於透過組織制度在其偏差與偏差動員的行為上加以調整對北京與台灣政府之利益得失關係，以使美國對中關係正常化的目標儘速達成。
本文旨從偏差動員之概念為核心，分析尼克森、福特與卡特總統不斷運用偏差與偏差動員，達成最終目標的政經過程與特性。包括國家、政府與決策行為者在組織、制度與國際環境變遷時，在對中關係正常化決策與政策行為所隱含改變二元國際對抗為多元和平體制。三位總統在偏差與偏差動員下，反映了美國總統及其政府對中關係的外交與安全觀點，也驗證渠等之主張、政策、措施、規則、程序、組織、制度、法規等，所對應相關行為者之間的利害得失關係。
分析架構上，本文強調三個面向，首先，從全球戰略角度，看美國政府體制在二戰後國際性歷史結構的鑲嵌；其次，從美國國內政經體制之脈絡，看美國政經結構的特色；第三，從政策實踐的角度，看美國政府的實踐運作。自1945年美國成為世界霸權後，尼克森、福特與卡特三個政府，有其不同的組織制度內涵和運作方式，分別出現尼克森強調尼克森主義、秘密外交、區域安全，福特偏向維持現狀及卡特主張卡特主義等等。
本文從美國總統、國安會、國務院、中情局、國防部與國會在組織、制度與政策上在聯結各層次行為者的網絡關係中，分析其所隱含影響各行為者在資源汲取和利用上的方式與結果，且同時涉及各行為者間政經行為的特定利害得失關係之偏差模式。在國內或國際層面，也可看到美中建立新關係時的制度與修正上所展開的政經性偏差動員與反動員（國會通過《台灣關係法》），各種制度與意識形態變遷（戰略利益優先於反共意識形態）等，都是表現特定勢力與特定政府偏好於不同制度相互衝突的結果。
本文總結尼克森、福特與卡特三位總統對中共關係正常化的偏差與偏差動員的相同與相異之處，並探索他們對改變兩極對抗為多極和平均衡體制，對中共與台灣等相關行為者的利害得失與因果影響。

關鍵字

偏差動員 ； 尼克森主義 ； 卡特主義 ； 「美中關係正常化」

並列摘要

The creator does not give human beings a resourceful rose garden. Human always struggle through constant competition or fighting for distribution and utilization of limited resources, and having development of political and economic organization and system to resolve various kinds of problems.
The U.S. President Richard Nixon tried to go through the concept of multi-polarity of the world to counter-fight the wildness of the Soviet Union's hegemonic expansion around the world。He proposed to normalize the relations with China in secret diplomacy,with“two Chinas” as a transitional measurement, in order to establish the formal diplomatic relations as his final resettlement of the goal in combining well with PRC's requirement of “ One China's Principle”.
But, the most difficult part of the normalization was to tackle the issue of the U.S.-Taiwan relations. In Taiwan there were still parts of the U.S. strategic national interests in maintaining the stability of the western Pacific area, and deterring the potential aggression by use of force from the rising regional power of Communist China. President Nixon also knew “abandoning Taiwan”was “domestic political suicide”，he could not afford to the risk in his presidential term to publicly antagonize the congressmen who supported Taiwan , public opinions still in favor of supporting Taiwan and political rivalries at his back always in preparing to find opportunities to expel him out of his office. He is always under the threats of the medias to leak out his details in procession of “mobilization of bias”(MOB)in tackling the normalization relations with PRC.
Finally, he reached the agreement with the PRC signing the “Shanghai Communique”in his stage, and established the liason office in Peijing, but without abandoning Taiwan officially in his way of MOB.
President Gerald R. Ford faced even worse dilemma. He tried also in Nixon's patterns of way to promote the normalization relations with PRC,but Nixon's “Watergate Scandal”had deteriorated the political accountability of the successor of the presidency . President Ford must be even more cautiously make determined efforts in MOB to process the normalization relations with PRC in preventing from criticism which would reduce the support of his reelection. But he still delayed his oral commitment of establishing official relations with PRC secretly in his term, and failed to abandon the official relations with Taiwan.
President Jimmy Carter understood his situation was not better than previous Nixon and Ford's administrations，the domestic political encountering still in minority of supporting the U.S.-PRC normalization relation with the precondition of severance of diplomatic relations, retreating U.S. troops, and abrogation of mutual defense treaty with Taiwan which were proposed by PRC. But Carter in his faith determined to proceed to terminate the official relations with Taiwan , which agreed to the PRC“the Three Points”.
He kept continuously in normalization relations with PRC to implement the goal of fully official relations in his ways of MOB, after his advocacy of signing “the Panama Canal Treaty ”which was in completion of passing by the U.S. Congress.
He believed through his movements of MOB the normalization relation with PRC would result in the same as he did the previous case of “Panama Canal Treaty”.
The text of the research in the approach of MOB is trying to get the insight of the details of the above mentioned three U.S. Presidents'movements of MOB from 1969-1979'and analyze how they implemented to their goals in their secret processing of Normalization Relations with PRC respectively which are still not revealed clearly to the world yet.

並列關鍵字

Mobilization of Bias ； the U.S. Policy of Normalization toward the PRC ； Nixonism ； Carterism

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