中國大陸債務問題

中國大陸是當今世界上第二大經濟體。然而，伴隨經濟發展，逐漸在各政府與經濟部門出現債務的積累。中國大陸債務背後的形成邏輯與因素及對於未來中國大陸經濟影響是本論文研究的焦點。首先，本論文從1978年中國大陸改革開放開始，由「制度分權」帶來中央—地方政府間的財政制度、金融體系轉變、企業產權改革，建立改革開放後中國大陸過去四十年來經濟發展奠基。接著，藉由中國大陸「產權改革」解析出中國大陸國有財產權與中國共產黨的關係及衍生問題。再次，結合上述的闡述，以中國大陸地方政府、地方政府融資平台及土地財政，分析中國大陸地方政府債務產生的邏輯。最後，以日本1990年代泡沫經濟的歷史經驗借鏡當前中國大陸地方經濟發展的潛藏風險，提醒中國大陸未來必須嚴防「Minsky Moment」的發生。

關鍵字

中國大陸地方政府債務；地方政府融資平台；國有財產權；中國共產黨；日本泡沫經濟

並列摘要

After the Reform and Opening-up in 1978, China has made strides in economic development.It continues to grow for over four decades. In the 1980s, China decentralized its financial system to help local enterprises and saw economic take-off. The property right reform in 1992 separated the ownership right from control right. This separation entitles the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) the complete property right over state-owned properties, banks ,and enterprises. Meanwhile, CCP members, representing (nomenklatura) and on behalf of the party-state, exercise control over and manage state-owned banks and enterprises, paving the way for future corruption. This thesis addresses issues involved with China’s local government debts. It specifies reasons why local governments are craving for funds to finance infrastructure constructions and the methods local governments use to finance these projects. The fast accumulation of local governments’debts is likely to affect China’s economic performance in the future. The thesis argues that the experiences of Japan’s bubble economy since 1990s might bear some resemblance to contemporary China. Given that level of local governments’ debts, the CCP party-state will have to manage the bad debts so as to avoid any possible “Minsky Moment”.