甘迺迪總統越南政策之理想主義與務實主義─以「有限夥伴關係」建立獨立暨非共南越

The Idealism and Pragmatism of President Kennedy's Vietnam Policy: Building an Independent and Noncommunist South Vietnam with“Limited Partnership”

賴柏村(Po-Tsun Lai)

指導教授 ： 尤本立

淡江大學/國際研究學院/美國研究所碩士班/碩士(2007年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2007.00509

摘要

論文提要內容：

美國從艾森豪政府時期開始逐漸涉入越南事務，一九四五年至一九五四年第一次印度支那戰爭期間，艾森豪總統越南政策採取「越戰國際化」方針，給予法國龐大經濟與軍事支援，期待法國消滅越南共黨勢力，然而一九五四年越盟於奠邊府擊敗法國，造成法國勢力撤出越南。法國撤出越南象徵艾森豪「越戰國際化」策略的失敗，爾後美國利用日內瓦會議防止共黨赤化越南，並且在一九五五年支持吳廷琰在北緯十七度線以南建立越南共和國，艾森豪總統欲利用「爭取時間」策略幫助南越建國，因此美國與吳廷琰展開長達八年合作。
甘迺迪總統於一九六一年上任後，雖未全盤接收艾森豪越南政策，卻支持艾森豪總統不對越南採取軍事干預越南的精神。甘迺迪政府初期，美國東南亞政策焦點在於寮國內戰，使得美國對南越歷經數個月模糊態度。一九六一年五月美國副總統詹森造訪南越，詹森此行應允吳廷琰增加美對越援助，強化美國對南越之承諾。甘迺迪總統於一九六一年十月派遣泰勒與羅斯托前往南越考察，兩人探知南越內部獨立建國意願，建立獨立暨非共南越成為甘迺迪越南政策理想性目標，而兩人考察報告的中心思想「有限夥伴關係」成為越南政策務實性方針，「有限夥伴關係」方針乃避免軍事干預越南的最佳選擇。
美國越南政策於一九六一年年底確立方針後，華府開始尋求鞏固南越政府的方法，雖然艾森豪時期利用「爭取時間」策略為南越建立獨立自主政府，由於艾森豪與吳廷琰過度強調南越內部安全而忽略南越政治、經濟的發展，使得南越政府極度缺乏民意支持，美國於一九六二年規劃「市民行動計畫」、「戰略村計畫」兩項具體政策期望為南越爭取民意。南越在實施此兩項計畫的過程中，吳廷琰扭曲美國對此兩項計畫的原意，將此兩項計畫視為控制南越人民的手段，加上吳廷琰推動此兩項計畫過快，造成此兩項計畫無法達成其目的。華府在一九六二年除尋求鞏固南越政府的方法外，南越在一九六二年軍事方面有大幅度進展，使得美國對於南越抱持樂觀態度，甚至擬定階段性撤出駐越軍事顧問團，但是一九六二年年底美國駐越媒體大幅報導南越政府負面消息與曼斯菲爾參議員南越考察報告，替美國對南越情勢評估帶來變數。
美國與南越關係於一九六三年產生劇烈變化，由於南越內部佛教徒危機，吳廷琰處理佛教徒危機的反應與態度，讓美國與南越之間產生不信任感，南越社會內部開始動盪不安。同年八月二十四日國務院對駐越大使館發出一封支持軍事政變的電報，使得南越軍方開始規劃軍事政變，同年九月至十月，華府內部為是否支持吳廷琰展開一系列辯論，最後華府決定不積極支持軍事政變，並且給予吳廷琰挽救情勢的機會，然而美國卻未積極阻止南越軍方推動軍事政變。一九六三年十一月初南越爆發軍事政變，吳廷琰政權遭受推翻，南越情勢急轉直下，甘迺迪越南政策未達成協助南越獨立建國的目的，美國與南越雙方皆需要為政策失敗負責。

關鍵字

甘迺迪 ； 越戰 ； 美越關係

並列摘要

Abstract:
The Americans gradually intervened in Vietnamese Affairs from the Eisenhower Administration. During the First Indochina War, President Eisenhower exploited“Internationalization of the Vietnam War”. He gave France economic and military support in order to defeat the Vietnamese communists. However, the French forces were defeated by Vietminh in Dienbienphu, which prompted France to retreat from Vietnam. The retreat of France represented the failure of Internationalization of the Vietnam War. Hereafter, the Americans used the Geneva Conference to prevent Vietnam from being communized. After the Gevneva Conference ended, the Americans supported Ngo Dinh Diem in establishing the Republic of Vietnam in Southern Vietnam in 1955. President Eisenhower wanted to exploit this as a well of“buying time”to build an independent South Vietnam and thus, started to cooperate with Diem for the next eight years.
Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower as American President in 1961. He did not accept all of Eisenhower’s Vietnam policy fully, but his Vietnam policy succeeded Eisenhower’s spirit--- American forces did not enter Vietnam. At the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, American Southeast Asia policy focused on Laos. Thus, American and South Vietnamese relations had been in ambiguity for several months in 1961. In May 1961, American Vice President Johnson visited South Vietnam, and he agreed with Diem , when Diem asked for extra aid in Johnson’s trip. In this way, the Americans added their promise to the South Vietnamese. President Kennedy sent Taylor and Rostow to inspect South Vietnam in October 1961. Taylor and Rostow received South Vietnamese active responses of building an independent country. Therefore, building an independent and noncommunist South Vietnam became the idealism for American Vietnam policy. The central thought of Taylor-Rostow Mission report focused on limited partnership, and this was the pragmatism of American Vietnam policy. “Limited partnership” became the best reason to avoid sending American forces to Vietnam.
After having a definite direction to Vietnam policy in late 1961, Washington started finding ways to strengthen the South Vietnamese government. Although President Eisenhower wanted to build an independent South Vietnam, its government was still lacking civilian support, because Eisenhower and Diem over-emphasised on security problems and ignored political and economic developments in South Vietnam. The Americans designed two concrete plans, firstly, the “Civic Action Program” and secondly, the “Strategic Helmet Program,”to attract civilian support for the South Vietnamese government. However, Diem curved the original purposes of the two plans, and considered them as ways of controlling the South Vietnamese. Besides Diem’s attitude toward the two plans, they operated too fast to fulfill their purpose. In 1962, America was optimistic about military advancement in South Vietnam, all except finding ways to strengthen the South Vietnamese government. Thus, America started to plan to retreat its Military Assistance and Advisory Group from South Vietnam in phases. However, news from American reporters’ about Diem regime and Senator Mansfield Report brought negative effects to America’s evaluation of the situation in South Vietnam.
American and South Vietnamese relations changed drastically in 1963, because the Buddhist Crisis burst out in South Vietnam. Washington and Saigon did not trust each other due to Diem’s stubborn attitude towards the Buddhist Crisis, and the harmony of South Vietnamese society was crushed down. In August 24th 1963, the Department of State passed a telegram to the American embassy in Saigon which announced support for a coup in Vietnam. Thus, South Vietnamese military officials started planning a coup. In Washington, the officials argued that if Diem should be overthrown at a series of conferences in September and October 1963. Finally, America decided not to support a coup actively and gave Diem’s regime a chance to save the situation. However, America did not stop the development of a coup in South Vietnam. A coup occurred in early November 1963 in Saigon. After Diem was overthrown, the situation in South Vietnam rapidly worsened. To sum up, Kennedy’s Vietnam policy did not live up to its purpose. Both Washington and Saigon should be held responsible for the failure of American Vietnam policy.

並列關鍵字

John F. Kennedy ； Vietnam War ； American-Vietnamese Relations

參考文獻

II. Books

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