烏克蘭寡頭政治與民主制度發展—1991至2019年

The Development of Oligarchs and the Political Institution in Ukraine — from 1991 to 2019

莊永豪(Yung-Hao Chuang)

指導教授 ： 許菁芸

淡江大學/國際事務學院/歐洲研究所碩士班/碩士(2021年)

https://doi.org/10.6846/TKU.2021.00726

摘要

本篇論文探討1991至2019年間烏克蘭的寡頭與政治體制的發展。從2019年4月一位毫無政治經驗的喜劇演員—澤倫斯基贏得總統選舉中可見，寡頭科洛莫伊斯基在背後的支持才是勝選的關鍵，目的是報復總統波羅申科對他的Privat銀行集團實施的「國有化」政策。對此，本文以寡頭與政府的鬥爭為動機，主要探討的目的為下：首先、除了一般型網絡理論，本文特別研究「蘇聯式的關係網絡」，在共產主義的社會中，人與人高度依賴彼此的關係成為後蘇聯國家特有的網絡關係，且隨著時間的演變，也成為人們在現今社會遵守的潛規則與「引領」；其次、烏克蘭的半總統制與「正式制度」，包含憲法、國會、內閣與總統，特別是總統為了政治目的對憲法進行「策略性修改」，成為烏克蘭正式制度上的缺陷；再者、烏克蘭的「非正式制度」：寡頭的興起與派系的形成，為了擴大商業利益的版圖，他們從進入地方政府、國會與內閣，及從對政府與總統的依賴，到間接甚至直接影響國家的政策走向；最後、以歷史制度主義分析在不同的總統任期之間，與不同的憲政體制下，正式制度與非正式制度在不同的總統任期間產生不同的變化，寡頭如何「利用」非正式制度彌補政治制度的不足。本文試圖證實烏克蘭寡頭從對正式制度的依賴到獨立，最終成為控制國家政治與經濟的幕後黑手。

關鍵字

烏克蘭寡頭政治 ； blat關係 ； 非正式制度 ； 半總統制 ； 歷史制度主義

並列摘要

This thesis explores the development of oligarchs and the political institution in Ukraine from 1991 to 2019. In April 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky, a comedian, won a landslide victory in presidential election, revealing the importance of support from oligarch, Ihor Kolomoisky. In a TV series, , Kolomoisky created Zelensky as an upright and ideal president to avenge the incumbent, Petro Poroshenko, for “nationalizing” his Privat Bank, the biggest bank in Ukraine. Based on this battle between oligarch and the former president, main purposes of this research are as follows: The first is to explain network theory, particularly “soviet relation and network”— the connection that people during the USSR relied closely on each other in everyday life, which still existed, and had turned into hidden rules and the “navigation” in modern society that everyone has to obey and follow. The second is to illustrate the formal institution, concerning Ukraine’s semi-presidentialism, including constitution, parliament, cabinet and president — especially the constitution, which has been strategically amended by presidents for their own purposes. The third area is the informal institution, which emphasizes the role of oligarchs in Ukraine, including their main clans in different regions (oblasts). To expand largely the scope of business, they stretched their arms in local administrations, parliament, and government for power and to maneuver the policy either indirectly or directly in their favor. The final is to analyze how formal and informal institutions, through historical institutionalism, influenced each other in each period of presidency and under different constitutional systems. Oligarchs’ manipulation of informal institution makes up for the weakness of formal institution. That is, this thesis intends to prove that oligarchs, from dependence to independence on formal institution, became the “hidden strong hand”, controlling Ukraine’s economy and politics.

並列關鍵字

Oligarchy in Ukraine ； blat relation and network ； informal institutionalism ； semi-presidentialism ； historical institutionalism

參考文獻

網路資料

Adam R Brown. “Coase: The nature of the firm”. Resource: https://adambrown.info/p/notes/coase_the_nature_of_the_firm. Last updated: 02 August 2020.

Amann, Melanie; Heffner, Stephan; Knobbe, Martin ; Müller, Ann-Katrin; Puhl, Jan; Rosenbach, Marcel; Sarovic, Alexander; Schmitt, Jörg; Wiedmann-Schmidt, Wolf; Zeller, Anika. 2019. “Documents Link AfD Parliamentarian to Moscow”. Spiegel International. April 12. Resource: https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/documents-link-afd-parliamentarian-to-moscow-a-1261509.html. Last updated: April 23 2020.

Aris, Ben. 2019. “VOX: The nationalisation of PrivatBank”. Bne_INTELLINEWS. June 17. Resource: https://www.intellinews.com/vox-the-nationalisation-of-privatbank-162911/. Last updated: April 26 2021.

Arnold, Tom; Zinets, Natalia. 2019. “PrivatBank wins London appeal in lawsuit against ex-owners”. Reuters. October 15. Resource: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-privatbank-idUSKBN1WU1JE. Last updated: April 28 2021.