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  • 學位論文

從政治預算循環觀點探究地方政府之預算結構及其影響

Local Government’s Budget Structures and the Effect of Economic Growth : A Political Budget Cycle Perspective

指導教授 : 張慈佳
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摘要


由於民主政治的發展,使得選舉競爭越趨激烈,因此本研究嘗試以政治預算循環觀點,探討地方首長是否認為在某一政事別增加支出,能討好選民需求,達到獲得勝選連任的目的,以及受選舉因素影響的財政支出,對地方經濟發展是否產生顯著影響。本研究利用台灣地區21縣市,1992年至2006年之相關統計資料,並以Panel Data模型進行實證分析,實證結果歸納如下: 在財政支出政治預算循環模型部分,研究發現地方政府的財政支出在總歲出、一般政務支出、教科文支出、經濟發展支出、社會福利支出與債務支出與選舉年變數呈顯著正相關,顯示地方首長面臨選戰壓力,會藉由執政優勢來操作財政政策工具企圖影響選情,達成個人或政黨之政治目的;受支持程度與財政支出之關係為顯著負相關,顯示地方首長因憂心落選,傾向於總歲出、一般政務支出、社區環境支出增加支出;地方府會結構與財政支出之關係為顯著正相關,顯示地方首長與議會大多數議員同屬一政黨,傾向於一般政務支出、教科文支出、經濟發展支出及其他支出擴張支出;縣市長是否為新任與地方財政之關係為負相關,顯示已連任之縣市長雖然不能再參選,但為了維護政黨利益,仍有誘因擴大支出預算替政黨候選人鋪路。 在財政支出與地方經濟發展模型部分,研究發現總歲出、教科文支出、經濟發展支出及社會福利支出與地方經濟發展呈正向關係,但統計結果均不具顯著性,推論原因可能為財政支出政策存在時間落後效果;其次,地方政府教科文支出大多花在教育人事成本,無法提升教育品質;再者,地方政府因政策決策不當、規劃設計不周全及低估設施使用率,造成公共設施閒置。一般政務支出及債務支出與地方經濟發展之關係為負向關係,一般政務支出多為人事費用支出,不能增加市場有效需求;債務支出增加,可能造成地方政府總歲出運用僵化,甚至對其他支出產生排擠效果,將阻礙經濟發展。

並列摘要


The developments of democracy politics make electoral competition to be violent. For this reason, We probed into whether municipal incumbents think that increase certain expenditures can please voters’ demands and relationship between expenditure and the local economic growth at a political budget cycle perspective. We adopted the panel data model, which employ the data of 21 counties and cities in Taiwan for the period from 1992 to 2006. In part of expenditure political budget cycle model, local government’s expenditures such as total expenditure, government affairs, education science and culture, economic development, social welfare and debt, versus the parameter of election year shows positive correlation. It reveals municipal incumbents face the stress of election with intention to manipulate the financial policy tools in order to achieve their personal or party’s purpose. Degree of support versus the influence of expenditure shows negative correlation. This reveals municipal incumbents worry about failure and therefore trend to raise expenditures such as total expenditure, government affairs and community development environmental. With the parameter of structure between municipal incumbents and parliament, the influence of expenditure shows positive correlation. It reveals when municipal incumbent’s party and most councilors’ party are the same, that local government trend to raise expenditure such as government affairs, education science and culture, economic development and other expenditure. With the parameter of whether municipal incumbent is a new office or not, the influence of expenditure shows negative correlation. It presents even though incumbents cannot attend election again, they have reasons to expand expenditure for the party’s profit. In part of expenditure and local economic growth model, local government’s expenditure such as total expenditure, education science and culture, economic development, social welfare versus local economic growth shows positive correlation. But these results are not statistically significant, hence we assumed several explanations: first, policies have time lag effects for the most part. Secondly, local government’s education science and culture expenditure spend in educational personnel expenses mostly, so the quality of education cannot be improved. Moreover, local governments making ill-decision, designing defect plans and underestimating the rate of utilization of facilities, cause the public facilities to leave unused. In addition, the correlation of government affairs expenditure and debt expenditure with local economic growth shows negative. Government affairs expenditure is mostly the personnel expenses, which cannot stimulate the effective demands of market; Increasing the debt expenditure may cause the total expenditure to be rigid, even to squeeze other expenditure. This will hinder local economic growth.

參考文獻


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