人工生殖法之胚胎銷毀正當性研究

人工生殖技術使生命發展的初期過程不再限於母體內而得以移至體外發生，形成自然受孕所沒有的體外胚胎之狀態。其中，由於體外胚胎之法律性質特殊，不同學說之間對其難有明確且統一之定論。又，體外胚胎之處置問題往往牽涉當事人生育權、人工生殖子女利益與身分秩序之考量，為了避免複雜的法律關係，人工生殖法第21條第3項第1款規定了人工生殖過程中，受術夫妻婚姻無效、撤銷、離婚或一方死亡的情形下，胚胎應銷毀。然而，由於胚胎之銷毀不可逆，在不孕治療需求提高以及少子化的現今社會，不但是生殖資源之浪費，且系爭規定剝奪胚胎所有權人在婚姻外將胚胎用於生育的共識空間，其對雙方生育自主權之干預是否正當且合理，不無疑問。因此，本文採法釋義學方法、文獻分析法與比較法研究方法，由科學角度和立法之立場釐清體外胚胎之本質，並由學說見解分析體外胚胎之法律性質與處置問題，又借鏡歐洲人權法院與美國的相關法規、實務案例和學說見解，分析上述胚胎銷毀規定之正當性。本文發現，體外胚胎處置議題中可採用「多元權利結構」解釋，其「特殊之物」的法律地位屬於具有物權與「人類尊嚴」之二元權利性質。受術夫妻雙方對其共有之人工生殖胚胎有相等的所有權，處置上應得雙方同意，為顧及子女利益與身分秩序等公共利益之必要，始得以法律適當限制雙方生育權。然而，目前我國法律忽略了在受術夫妻婚姻無效、撤銷、離婚或一方死亡時應適度讓當事人保有合意將胚胎用於生育的空間，且胚胎之銷毀不可回復，經比例原則的驗證，系爭規定已過度干預當事人生育權。因此，本文主張，即使在人工生殖技術之使用限於夫妻的前提下，婚姻撤銷、無效、離婚或一方死亡的胚胎所有權人，仍有權在滿足一定要件時將胚胎繼續用於生育。本文提出受術夫妻受術夫妻婚姻無效、撤銷、離婚和一方死亡之情形，可修法增加但書，在胚胎銷毀前設置適當緩衝期。並於婚姻撤銷、無效、離婚之情形中，允許雙方同意且能確保子女得到來自家長的教養支持時，得將胚胎用於生育；一方死亡之情形中，在現行法尚未允許代孕之限制下，應以夫生前明示同意妻於其死後繼續使用胚胎之書面，以及妻經過適當諮詢後同意繼續使用胚胎為要件，在一定期間內允許妻於夫死後繼續使用胚胎生育，使法律之限制符合必要且正當之程度。

關鍵字

人類體外胚胎；人工生殖法；胚胎銷毀；生育自主權；死後人工生殖

並列摘要

The development in assisted-reproduction technique(ART), In Vitro Fertilization(IVF), has brought the journey of early human life outside of a womb. It allows the formation of in-vitro embryo, which has been impossible for conception in natural process. The legal status of in-vitro embryo is so special that it has caused the inconsistency in definition among different legal doctrines. Also, concerns of procreative autonomy, the interest of ART children and order in civil relationship are often involved in legal issues of embryo disposition, which makes them even complicated. Therefore, Assisted Reproduction Act has set rules for destruction of embryo in certain circumstances to prevent the disputes above. Article 21 Paragraph 3 Subsection 1 of Assisted Reproduction Act reads that “An assisted reproduction institution shall destroy an embryo created for a specific recipient couple where one of the following conditions is satisfied: 1. The marriage of the recipient couple is invalid or annulled, the couple divorces, or one spouse dies.” However, with the decreasing birth rate and increasing need of in-vitro embryos in treatments for infertility, the irreversible consequence of embryo destruction is a waste of reproductive resources. Moreover, the law prevents couples who own the embryo to have a second thought of embryo disposition when it is to be destroyed, which might possibly violate against their procreative autonomy. It seems that the legitimacy of statute is to be doubted. Thus, this research aims to take an examination on the legitimacy of articles related to embryo destruction in Assisted Reproduction Act that mentioned above. It analyzes the legal status and dispositional issues of in-vitro embryo by adopting judicial interpretation method, literature analysis and comparative research method. Then, through exploring laws, literatures and judicial cases in the US and European Court of Human Rights, it analyses some principles which could help solving the concerns, instead of destroy them anyway. This research figures out that the “multi-element-legal-entitlement structure” could be adopted to explain the legal status of the in-vitro embryo in dispositional issues, which is a dual feature of “mankind dignity” along with the property right concept. Both of the couple have the same ownership and decisional authority toward the disposition of ART embryo. It shows that the current law in Taiwan does not have enough public interests to completely deprive the reproductive rights of embryo owners when both of the couples agree upon the implantation of the in-vitro embryo. Thus, this research argues that embryo owners should be allowed to continue the implantation in above situations under certain conditions even the law prohibits assisted reproduction without marriage. To ensure the legitimacy in law, this research proposes that there should be a proper cooling-off time before the destruction of embryos in invalid or annulled marriage, divorced couples and posthumous procreation. As for the requirements of implantation in above situations, for the former, the couple should both give consent to the implantation and insure the supportive parenting for future ART children. For the later, while surrogacy is prohibited in the current law, the deceased husband should have given consent to his wife about the use of the embryo for posthumous procreation in written forms when he was alive. In addition, the wife should have received sufficient and proper consult before giving consent to finish the implantation of the embryo in a certain period of time.