攸關性及可靠性為決定會計資訊品質的主要要素,可靠性將影響會計資訊的攸關性。近年來實務界開始注意到企業外部報告的品質,例如以盈餘反應係數評估盈餘品質以及對應計項目之討論。因此,本研究亦建構在效率市場的假說下,使用具攸關性的財務報表資訊與隨機成本邊界函數建立一適當的評價邊界模型,以探討在既定的評價模式下,市場對個別公司的評價差異,是否與該公司財務報表的可靠程度不同有關。 隨機邊界的優點在於可將所有基本分析的攸關資訊皆納入評價分析中。近年來,財務界有部份學者(例如:Hunt-McCool et al. 1996; Chen et al. 1999;及Koop and Li 2001等)利用經濟上較常用的隨機邊界模型(stochastic frontier model),由樣本資料估計各樣本公司之公司最大可能價值,進而將模式之無效率指標解讀為IPO公司根據評價模式得出之最大可能承銷價與承銷訂價間差額,以突破傳統折價計算之限制。然而,就已上市上櫃公司樣本,在相同充分揭露條件下,本研究認為模式採用相同之攸關財務報導資訊所得出各公司最大可能價值,此一最大可能價值與市場實際價格差異,除財務報導無法反應之未來成長機會等資訊外,不宜完全歸因於市場錯誤訂價所致,也可能是公司之財務報導品質有所差異,造成實際價格低於不考慮可靠性時,只依會計數字決定出來的最大價值。是以如同多數財務會計上的研究,本研究接受效率市場假說,進而分析探討市場評價無效率的原因。 實證結果發現: (一)內部操縱 關係人交易與個別公司相對訂價效率值間大都呈現不顯著或顯著正相關,表示關係人交易並無法用來說明公司間的評價差異。另外,四個異常應計數字的替代衡量變數在簡單迴歸與複迴歸分析中,所得到的實證檢測結果都不一致,部份模式下是顯著正相關,但有部份模式是呈顯著負相關,其他則為不顯著,表示異常應計數字與公司間相對評價效率值的關係並不顯著,應計項目數字可能無法做為財務報表品質的替代衡量變數。 (二)內部監督 董事會中董事兼任經理人員的人數與公司間相對訂價效率值間是呈顯著負相關,顯示出投資人對於董事會中董事兼任經理人員人數愈少的公司,會給予較高的市場評價。 (三)內部控制 不論在哪個評價模式下,審計品質虛擬變數與公司間的相對訂價效率值間是呈顯著負相關,表示當審計品質愈佳時,則公司的內部控制情況亦較佳,因此財務報表可靠程度會較高,市場對該公司的評價也會較高。 (四)外部監督 不論在哪個評價模式下,金融信託機構持股比例與公司評價效率值呈顯著正相關。表示在相同評價資訊下,金融信託持股比例較高的公司,市場所給予的評價亦會較高。
Decision useful information comes with certain level of relevance and reliability. Reliability which means precision and free from manipulation affects the relevance of information. Accountants in academics and practice put greater concerns on reliability in these years. Research on earnings quality via earnings response coefficients or difference between cash flows and net income gains popularity. Also with efficient markets as maintained hypothesis, present study uses stochastic frontier regression to estimate the maximum possible value from fundaments for Taiwan’s listed companies. The one-sided residuals are used as a measure in assessing the reliability of the financial reporting where those fundaments from. Stochastic frontier regression is used by finance researchers in valuing IPO underpricing. The use of one-sided residuals obtained from the valuation model as the extent of underpricing gives researchers opportunities to study underpricing without reference to the close prices. This study use mature listed companies as sample and fundamentals from financial reporting as input variables in the valuation model. The one-sided residuals, the difference between maximum possible prices determined by fundamentals and market equilibrium prices, may result from differential reliability of inputs once market inefficiency is ruled out. The magnitude of one-sided residuals is related to quality measures such as discretionary accruals. Our empirical results indicate that: (1) Internal manipulation Empirical relationship between related-party transaction and price efficiency index is insignificant or positively significant, it implies that related-party transaction cannot explain the valuation differences among companies. Four measurements of abnormal accruals give contradictive empirical results in simple- and multi-regression analyses. The relations can be significantly positive or significantly negative. Measurement errors preclude drawing conclusion on the relation between abnormal accruals and pricing efficiency index. Thus, the possibility that accruals may not reflect the quality of financial statements cannot be ruled out. (2) Internal monitoring The relation between the number of board of directors who are also the managers simultaneously and pricing efficiency index is significantly negative. It implies that the less number of board of directors who are also the manager simultaneously, the higher extent market reflect fundamentals of the company. (3) Internal controls The relation between dummy variables for auditing quality and pricing efficiency index is significantly negative in every model. It means that the company with high auditing quality has efficient internal control. Because of this relation, both the reliability of financial statement and market valuation of company improve. (4) external monitoring The relation between shareholding percentage of banking institutions and pricing efficiency index is significantly positive. It indicates that the higher shareholding ratio hold by banking institutions, the higher market valuation of company under the same valuation information.
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