本研究的目的在於探討董監事股權質押與公司信用評等影響的關連性,以驗證質押所引發的代理問題是否會對公司信用評等產生影響。研究結果發現,當公司董監事股權質押比率愈高,公司的信用評等結果也越不好。由於董監事持股質押加深控制股東與外部股東之間的代理問題,其可能透過一系列複雜的盈餘管理模式去操作公司的經營績效,以防股價下跌被迫斷頭出清而損失財富,甚至可能進一步去掏空公司營運資金。當公司董事、監察人有這現象,的確會讓公司承受董監事個人財務操作風險,在信用評等上也就不會有較好之評等等級。本研究也亦把控制變數-股份盈餘偏離差比率以中位數分組和2007年強制上市櫃公司設置獨立董監年度前後分組,各別測試與信用評等的關係,其研究結果亦與預期一致,董監事股權質押比率愈高,公司的信用評等結果也越不好。
This study aims to explore the relationship between collateralized shares percentage of board members and company’s credit rating and to verify whether such agency problems of equity pledge will impact company's credit rating. The empirical results show that the higher the percentage of equity pledge is, the poorer the company's credit rating will be. Equity pledge of board members can deteriorate agency problems between controlling shareholders and outside shareholders. Controlling shareholders may manipulate the company performance by complex earnings management to keep stock price from falling and prevent loss from forced liquidation. Even more, they may further misappropriate company’s working capital. The pledge of board members actually makes the company to undertake their financial operational risk and lead the company to be rated a poor credit score. This study also uses the deviation rates between voting rights and cash flow rights as control variables and groups them by median and by the year before and after 2007, in which Mandatory Set-up of Independent Director and Supervisor takes effect. Then the groups are separately tested to explore the relationship between the company’s credit rating and the control variables. The results show the consistency with the author’s expectation that the higher the equity pledge is, the poorer the company's credit rating will be.