公司負責人之忠實義務 ─以公司機會原則為中心

Duty of Loyalty of Corporate Directors and Officers - Focusing on the Taking of Business Opportunity

簡靖軒(Jing-Syuan Jian)

指導教授 ： 楊竹生

中原大學/法學院/財經法律研究所/碩士(2017年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201700125

摘要

隨著經濟之發展，公司組織日益壯大，所面臨之商業機會日益增多，公司負責人如董事或經理人等權利逐漸擴大，其等位處公司重要地位常可接觸大量商業資訊，若公司負責人事不盡其應盡之責任，或是濫用其權限，為自己或他人謀取私利，卻仍准許公司負責人可任意取得並利用公司之商業機會，將自己置於與公司利益衝突之位置上，勢必可能影響公司之生存發展。
我國自民國90年新修正公司法於第23條第1項，第一次出現出現公司負責人應盡「忠實義務」之規定，復於101年於公司法第23條第3項增訂違反忠實義務者應返還所得利益，可見，忠實義務於我國逐漸受到重視，其重要性不容小覷。然忠實義務畢竟屬於較上位之概念，定義上過於抽象，在適用上有其困難，為解決公司負責人掠奪屬於公司商業機會之問題，英美等國乃發展出所謂之「公司機會原則」，禁止公司負責人在未經公司同意之情況下，將原屬於公司之潛在商業機會轉移自已利用而從中謀取私利，若公司負責人擅自奪取屬於公司之商業機會，則公司可請求其返還因此所受之利益。透過公司機會原則之確立，英美公司法將公司負責人掠奪公司商業機會之行為視為違反忠實義務之一種類型，進而加以規範，以維護公司獲取利益、積極擴展之機會。
反觀我國無如英美等國「公司機會原則」之制度及具體規範，僅有公司法第23條忠實義務之抽象規定，不但未明確闡釋忠實義務定義，適用上更有諸多困難，然實際上公司負責人侵占公司商業利益之情形層出不窮，其中不乏基於個人利益掠奪原屬於公司商業機會之案例，現行公司法對此類行為之規範明顯不足進而產生規範漏洞，實有必要引進公司機會原則。
本文將從公司機會原則之上位概念受託義務及忠實義務談起，再介紹公司機會原則發源地美國其實務、學說及其規範對此原則之相關操作與運用，進而對忠實義務具體規範有更深切之了解，探討引進公司機會原則對我國公司治理管控之重要性。

關鍵字

公司機會原則 ； 忠實義務

並列摘要

With on-going economic development, organizational structures have grown significantly. As a result, rights and powers vested in the responsible person of a company such as the director or officer are gradually broadening owing to the expansion of commercial opportunities faced upon on a daily basis. The aforesaid person is strategically positioned to have access to massive amount of commercial information. In the event that the responsible person of a company not honoring his responsibilities incumbent on, abusing his powers, or seeking interests for himself or others, he is still at any given time permitted to obtain and use company’s commercial opportunities. This practice has placed conflict of interests between oneself and the company and will inevitably manifest impacts on the company’s survival as well as development.

In the amendment to the Taiwan Companies Act made in 2001, article 23-1 provided provisions specifying that the responsible person of a company owes “fiduciary duty of loyalty” to the company for the very first time. Further in 2012, revision of the Taiwan Companies Act added article 23-3 wherein stipulates that party violated his fiduciary duty of loyalty shall return his acquired interests. Henceforth, fiduciary duty of loyalty is receiving due weight in Taiwan and its importance should not be underestimated. However, fiduciary duty of loyalty is nonetheless a somewhat conceptual metaphor of distance and definition thereof is strikingly abstract, therefore, lead to difficulty in its application. In order to solve issues relating to the responsible person of a company snatching commercial opportunities that associate with the company, countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States of America have developed so-called “corporate opportunity doctrine”. Therein, the responsible person of a company is prohibited from seeking self-interest by transferring potential commercial opportunities associated with the company for his own use and profit without the consent of the company. In cases where the responsible person of a company snatching commercial opportunities associated with the company without authorization, that company may request the return of acquired interests. Through the materialization of the corporate opportunity doctrine, the UK and US Companies Acts deem that the responsible person of a company snatching commercial opportunities associated with the company as a type of violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Further regulations can be enforced thereon to safeguard the company’s opportunities in respect of profit generation as well as proactive expansion.
In contrast, Taiwan does not offer formalized systems or regulations similar to the UK and US’s “corporate opportunity doctrine”. What Taiwan provides is an abstract provision of fiduciary duty of loyalty in article 23 of the Taiwan Companies Act. The definition of fiduciary duty of loyalty is not precisely outlined therein. Furthermore, the application thereof faces countless hinderances. As the emergence of actual cases where the responsible person of a company embezzles company’s commercial interests relentlessly assume, instances of exploiting company’s commercial opportunity for personal gains has become a commonplace. The Taiwan Companies Act currently in force is ostensibly inadequate to regulate the aforesaid acts. A heightened urgency is consequently desirable for the introduction of the corporate opportunity doctrine.
This dissertation will embark on the elucidation of the conceptual metaphor of distance hinged on the fiduciary duty of loyalty in the corporate opportunity doctrine. Secondly, the introduction of the origin of the corporate opportunity doctrine, namely the US, its operations and applications of the practice, theories, as well as regulations thereto. Wherefore, a deeper understanding in regards to the materialization of the fiduciary duty of loyalty can be attained. And that the importance of managing Taiwan’s companies by introducing the corporate opportunity doctrine can be acquiesced.

並列關鍵字

Corporate Opportunity ； Duty of Loyalty

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