家族企業與薪資酬勞對創新的影響 -台灣半導體產業之實證研究

Family Firms, Incentive Compensation, and Firm Innovation- Evidence of Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry

賴立瑋(Li-Wei Lai)

指導教授 ： 俞海琴

中原大學/商學院/國際經營與貿易研究所/碩士(2014年)

https://doi.org/10.6840/cycu201400306

摘要

本文說明台灣家族企業與薪資酬勞和家族創新的影響，而我們研究方法使用了專利權和引證，並探討一家公司的主要經理人(包含CEO)之基本薪資、獎金、退休金、現金股利、股票股與選擇權等等。而家族企業視為台灣多半公司營運體系，然而對公司的主要經理與股東激勵使代理成本減少。因此，我們探討當以長期與短期的激勵方式給主要經理人，使公司具有創新性與競爭力。

而本文探討2000年至2011年間，台灣半導體產業共804筆資料，資料由TEJ 資料庫。並認為家族企業對主要經理人薪資激勵後，會對公司更具有創新性與競爭性。而家族的特色有公司年齡、公司規模、負債比例、現金流量比率、資本支出比率、淨營運資金比率、研發與發展費用率與台灣2000的網路泡沫化與2008-2010金融風暴等。則我們結論顯示說明家族企業有著較低的創新能力，而針對給予主要經理人之薪資報酬的激勵。而我們發現當家族企業給予較多或較高的薪資報酬時會有著顯著的創新能力在專利權與引證下。薪資報酬是極為重要的，不管是短期報酬或長期報酬都會使一家公司的主要經理人對公司有著提升創新性與競爭力。

關鍵字

公司治理、家族企業、企業創新、薪資酬勞

並列摘要

This paper examines the relationships among family-owned firms, compensation and firms’ innovation. We measure a firm’s innovation by a firm’s number of patents and the citations of each patent. We measure CEO compensation by CEO salary, bonus, cash, stock, and stock options. Due to the family firms are the popular types of enterprises in Taiwan, and family firms have their specialties on incentive mechanisms based on less agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. We thus investigate the relationships between family firms and innovation after considering the incentive mechanisms of compensations.
Using Taiwanese listed firms over 2000-2011, with a total of 804 observations, we are able to examine if family-owned firms exhibit higher innovation after considering compensation incentive. Our sample observations are obtained from TEJ database. We also control for the firms' characteristics, such as age, size, leverage, cash flow ratio, capital expenditure ratio, net working capital, R D ratio and some events and year dummies. Our results show that family firms have lower innovation activities. However, after adding compensation, we find that family firms with better compensation package to exhibit better innovation activities including patent numbers and citations. Results show that compensations are crucial, even for a family firm in the short- and long-term prospective. Our results imply some useful information for decision maker who design the compensation packages for the executives.
Keywords：Corporate Governance, Family Firms, Firm Innovation, Executive Compensation.

並列關鍵字

Corporate Governance ； Family Firms ； Executive Compensation. ； Firm Innovation

參考文獻

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