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  • 學位論文

外溢性公共財之競租分析

Rent Seeking for Public Goods with Jurisdictional Spillovers

指導教授 : 翁仁甫
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摘要


基於許多競租活動中之競租標的,往往兼具公共財與轄區外溢性特質的認知,本文透過擴展Katz et al. (1990) 的公共財競租模型,在競租標的兼具公共財以及轄區外溢性兩種特質的情況下,從事競租分析。   本文首先分別將公共財的外部性分為外部效果及外部成本兩個部份,個別分析競租活動對社會浪費的影響,並試圖探討其結果是否會因加入競租的轄區數量增加而改變,發現:(1) 隨著跨轄區外部利益(成本)的提高,競租活動所造成之競租社會成本會下降(提高);(2) 忽略競租標的創造的跨轄區外部利益(成本)將會導致競租社會成本的高估(低估);(3) 當競租標的之跨轄區外部利益效果與區內效果完全相同時,競租社會成本將會等於零,可忽略之;(4) 上述結果不會因加入競租的轄區數量增加而改變。其次,就轄區間能力的異質性─貧富差距作討論時,之所以將能力的異質性考慮進來是因為有著不同稟賦的地區對於相同的公共財帶來的區內效果及外溢效果會有所差異,同樣地分別就外部效果及外部成本兩個部份來討論,發現:當競租標的製造跨轄區外部成本時,相對於貧窮轄區而言,富裕轄區成功取得競租標的之可能性會比較高;反之,當競租標的創造跨轄區外部利益的情況下,貧窮與富裕轄區取得競租標的之機會究竟孰高孰低,需視情況而定,理論上皆有可能。最後,有鑒於轄區的劃分方式不同將改變轄區間外部性的強度,進而對轄區間的競租活動產生影響,經過討論分析後發現,當競租標的具轄區外溢性時,轄區的劃分方式確實會是影響競租社會成本的重要因素。

關鍵字

公共財 轄區外溢性 外部性 競租

並列摘要


This paper extends the rent-seeking model for public goods in Katz, Nitzan and Rosenberg (1990). We conduct rent-seeking analysis under the premise that the rent-seeking target combines the characteristics of public goods and jurisdictional spillovers. We find: (1) as the cross-jurisdictional external benefit (cost) increases, the social cost caused by rent-seeking activities will decrease (increase); (2) ignoring the cross-jurisdictional external benefit (cost) created by the rent-seeking target will result in over-estimation (under-estimation) of the social cost; when the cross-jurisdictional external benefit effect and the jurisdictional internal effect of the rent-seeking target are exactly the same, the social cost will be close to zero, and is negligible; (3) when rent-seeking target causes cross-jurisdictional external cost, a wealthier group will tend to spent more for public goods and thus raise its chances of obtaining the goods; when rent-seeking target creates cross-jurisdictional external benefit, whether the poorer or the richer groups will have a better chance to get the rent-seeking target will depend on the circumstances.;(4) when the rent-seeking target has the characteristic of jurisdictional spillovers, the arrangement of jurisdiction will be an important factor affecting the social cost in rent-seeking activities.

參考文獻


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