存在隱匿產出活動下的合夥關係與共有資源之利用

Heinzelmann et al. (2009) 提出了可以透過多重合夥關係來達成效率使用共有資源(common resources) 的概念，本文以Heinzelmann et al. (2009) 的分析架構為基礎，進一步將合夥團體(組織) 的成員，可能會透過隱匿產出的方式來提升自身淨利益的情況納入考慮，探討合夥關係中的產出隱匿行為，對於共有資源利用的可能影響效果。本文的分析顯示，在合夥團體的數量被控制在未考慮合夥關係中可能存在隱匿產出問題下的最適數量後，還需要相關當局配合對隱匿產出行為進行強力的查緝與懲處，才能讓共有資源的利用達到效率狀態。另外，當合夥團體的數量低於未考慮合夥關係中可能存在隱匿產出問題下的最適數量時，則是存在可以達成有效利用共有資源的最適政府查緝與懲處政策組合，並且在此一情況下，政府過度的查緝與懲處作為，反而有可能會造成共有資源利用不足的問題。

關鍵字

共有資源；隱匿產出；合夥關係

並列摘要

This paper adjusts the model of Heinzelmann et al (2009). We take into consideration the probable hidden output behavior in partnerships, and focus our discussion on the influence of hidden output behavior in partnerships on the utilization of common resources. Our finding shows that when the number of partnership groups is controlled at optimal number while the hidden output behavior in partnership is overlooked, the authorities’ strengthening of investigation and punishment of illegal output hiding activities is still necessary for an efficient utilization of common resources. On the other hand, when the number of partnership groups is less than the optimal number while the hidden output behavior in partnership is overlooked, we have an optimal investigation and punishment bundle; too strong the investigation and punishment under this circumstance may induce underutilization of common resources.

並列關鍵字

Common resources ； Hidden output ； Partnership

參考文獻

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存在隱匿產出活動下的合夥關係與共有資源之利用

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