從憲政主義論我國現行政府體制之定位

The political system of Taiwanese government─perspective of Constitutionalism

衛昊廷(HAO-TING WEI)

指導教授 ： 周育仁

國立臺北大學/公共事務學院/公共行政暨政策學系/碩士(2016年)

摘要

本研究係以憲政主義為核心並使用文獻分析及深度訪談等方法試圖探尋造成政府體制落差的成
因，希以透過較為宏觀且顧及整體的解釋途徑，釐清我國現行政府體制的定位。

首先，就總統任免行政院長的權力而言，憲法§53 以及憲法增修條文§3II 的規定應有其適用，
況歷年大法官解釋亦重申了行政院對立法院負責的基本架構，簡言之，即使我國在第四次修憲時取
消了立法院的閣揆同意權，總統還是必須要任命能對立法院負責的人選擔任閣揆，同時該人選必須
要能扮演最高行政首長的角色，始符合上開的解釋的旨意。另外本研究針對組閣的方式進行分析，
發現大法官第387、613 號解釋補足了憲法§56 的先天性不足，將行政院長依其政治理念組閣的政
治原則就此確立，申言之，大法官認為，行政乃是法律之執行，執行則必須仰賴人事，因此，行政
院長若未能擁有公務員的人事高權，即難以對立法院負責，且與憲法不符。最後，本研究置觀察的
重點於總統與行政院長的關係，發現憲法雖列舉了許多專屬於總統的權力，惟此等權力多屬於形式
上命令，不然就是受到其他機關的牽制而具被動性質，反觀其它在總統章節沒有列舉的行政權力，
依照大法官627 號解釋的意旨，將概括性的授予行政院長，是以，憲法§53 行政院長為我國最高行
政首長的規定，並沒有因為總統直選或立法院同意權的刪除而失效。

總的言之，我國現行的政府體制應被歸類為所謂的「總理總統制」或稱「改良式雙首長制」，
然就實際運作面而言，我國現行的政府體制乃偏向所謂的「總統議會制」或稱「弱總統制」，深究
此類落差產生之原因，除了法律面的解釋、亦包含了制度上的沿用及其他要素，惟本文採一貫立場
認為，除憲法與大法官解釋的途徑之外，其他因素諸如選舉制度、歷史脈絡、民情乃至行政院長的
自我認知均不宜作為改變現行政府體制之依據，特別是在總統直選的情況，蓋直選之目的只在於賦
予總統一定的民主正當性，與其當選之後的權力大小、範圍，乃至問責的方式均沒有任何的關聯
性，如誤將民主正當性與權力得失掛勾，將衍生出相當嚴重的後果。

關鍵字

憲政主義 ； 政府體制 ； 總統 ； 行政院長 ； 權力關係

並列摘要

The research is based on the perspective of “Constitutionalism” to probe into the factors causing the gap between the statute and the practice by using the method of literature study and interview. With an
macroscopic and integral interpretation, this research is being expected to clarify the orientation of the current government system.

First of all, speaking of the power possessing by the president to assign or to remove the premier, it should be limited in accordance with Article 53 of The Constitution and Article 3, paragraph 2 of The Amendment of the Constitution. Besides, judiciary interpretation also agree with the opinion that the premier is still the chief executive and have to shoulder the responsibility to make a report to the parliament even though the National Assembly had already adjusted the old Constitution. Moreover, this research also analyzed the pattern of the composing of the government. We found that Judicial Yuan Interpretation NO.387 and NO.613 had patched up the flaw of Article 56, The Constitution and had confirmed that the premier has the right to form a cabinet by himself as well. Scilicet, Justice of the Constitutional Court believed that administration stands for the enforcement of the law which relies on the staff of the cabinet. Therefore, if the premier can’t obtain the right to appoint the public servant, it is impossible for the Executive Yuan to take the responsibility. Lastly, this research put emphasis on the relationship between the president and the premier. In terms of power, the president truly owns few but has little relevance to do with governing the administration. On the contrary, the premier is in charge of the substantial power indeed. According to the Judicial Yuan Interpretation NO.627, the administrative power is generally granted to the premier. Hence, the premier is still the head of the government according to Article 53, The Constitution no matter The Amendment of the Constitution cancelled the right that the parliament can give approval to the candidate.

In conclusion, our current government system shall be categorized into “Premier-Presidential Regime” or “Semi-presidential Regime”. However, it tends to function as “President-Parliamentary Regime” or “Presidential regime” in reality. To get to the bottom of this problem, this research has aggregated numerous reason into 3 dimensions：law, institution and others. Nevertheless, we have to reaffirm that power can only be accessed due to the constitution. In other words, those issue we mentioned above cannot be deemed as a cogent reason to expand the president’s power. Especially the purpose of direct election is to draw democratic legitimacy from the elector rather than to judge the amount of power that a president can be acquired. It is not so much to say that constitutionalism plays an pivotal part to restrict the power of the government.

並列關鍵字

Constitutionalism ； Government system ； The president ； The premier ； Power relations

參考文獻

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