摘要
公司可利用兩種方式進行盈餘管理: (一)會計應計數盈餘管理及(二)實質經濟活動之盈餘管理。本研究以後者為探討目標，其作法為藉由實質交易活動去操控營業現金流來美化財報以達到盈餘目標，研究對象為1992年至2018年於COMPUSTAT陳列之公司，並排除受法規限制較大之產業及銀行等金融機構。主要採用Roychowdhury (2006) 之模型評估實質盈餘管理的量。本研究為探討公司CEO是否在存在某些特徵值時會造成實質盈餘管理之增加，納入考慮之特徵值為：過度自信、任期、年紀、激勵比率及薪酬。首先將單一特徵值及控制因公司本身獨特性而可能影響盈餘管理之因子進行回歸型分析後再同時納入所有特徵值於單一模型，觀察這些特徵值對實質盈餘管理之影響結果是否改變。實證結果顯示，CEO過度自信、激勵比率高、薪資低越容易透過實質盈餘管理來提高營收；另一方面進一步觀察所有特徵值對實質盈餘管理是否存在非線性關係時發現當CEO年紀大於46歲時會開始從事讓盈餘增加之盈餘管理，且年紀越大從事盈餘管理之程度會隨之增加。最後在交互作用分析中發現年紀較小之CEO其從事盈餘管理之程度會隨著公司槓桿比例上升而下降；任期較長之CEO對實質盈餘管理增加的量隨著市值增加而逐漸下降；擁有較高激勵比率及薪酬之CEO在股東權益報酬率上升的影響下也會逐漸降低實質盈餘管理程度。
並列摘要
There’re two methods for firms to manage earnings: one is accrual-based the other is real activities-based. Nowadays, more and more managers conduct the latter practice to depart the earnings from normal level in order to avoid reporting losses. They try to trick firms’ stakeholders into believing some financial goals have been achieved. The mainly objective of this research is to figure out whether CEO characteristics, such as optimism, tenure, age, incentive and compensation have relationship with the level of real earnings management. I want to know whether firms with some specific characteristic of CEOs are more likely to engage in manipulating earnings. The sample included in the study is listed firms from COMPUSTAT database between 1992 and 2018 and firms in regulated industries and banks and financial institutions are excluded. The empirical results show that firms with overconfident, lower compensation CEOs are more likely to do income-increasing earnings management. In the situation in which nonlinear relationship are taken into account and discover that CEOs’ age is the only characteristic that has nonlinear relationship with real earnings management. Finally, interaction term is included in my analysis, the results show that if CEOs are in firms with higher leverage, the level of real earnings management will be lower than firm with lower leverage, especially for young CEOs; The influence of CEOs’ tenure on income-increasing earnings management is more prominent in small firms than large firms; CEOs’ with higher incentive ratio and compensation will be less likely to conduct income-increasing real earnings management while ROE ratio increases.
參考文獻
延伸閱讀
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