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  • 學位論文

關鍵公司事件前後之實質及應計盈餘管理

Real and Accrual Earnings Management around Key Corporate Events

指導教授 : 黃宜侯

摘要


本研究探討在美國市場中,公司是否有動機在關鍵公司事件之前後期間做應計盈餘管理及實質盈餘管理,關鍵公司事件包含:股票分割、股票回購、財務重述以及併購交易中的主併公司及目標公司。我們發現: 第一,公司在股票分割後會使用使盈餘上升的盈餘管理來達到市場的正向預期、財務重述之前會使用此方法來得到公司的利益、併購交易的主併公司如果以股票為支付方式會使用此方法來降低購買目標公司的成本、併購交易的目標公司如果以現金為交易方式會使用此方法來增加目標公司股東的利益; 除此之外,公司在股票回購之前會使用使盈餘下降的盈餘管理來降低購回股票的成本。第二,由於沙賓法案的通過,使應計盈餘管理的使用有更多的限制,從資料顯示,在股票分割後和股票回購前,公司傾向使用實質活動的盈餘操控而不再是應計項目的操控。第三,分析師的盈餘預測是個影響公司做盈餘管理的重要因素,正好達到或沒達到盈餘預測的公司有更多的動機做盈餘的操控。第四,事件、分析師變數和公司特質的交互項會影響公司做盈餘管理,對於沒達到盈餘預測且獲利及規模越大的公司,越有動機在股票回購前以及主併公司使用股票為支付方式的併購案前做盈餘操控。

並列摘要


The research examines whether corporations have motivations to conduct accrual-based and real activities earnings management around key corporate events like stock splits, stock repurchases, financial restatements, mergers and acquisitions for acquirers and targets. The data is from the United States. We find that: First, firms would engage in income-increasing earnings manipulation after splits to meet positive expectations from capital market. Also, firms would do this before financial restatements to get their benefits, before M&A for acquirers in the payment of their stocks to reduce buying costs and before M&A for targets in the payment of acquirers’ cash to gain more benefits than stocks payment. Moreover, firms would engage in income-decreasing earnings manipulation before repurchasing to reduce costs of buying back. Second, the use of earnings manipulation has shifted from accruals to real activities around stock splits and repurchases. This may result from the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act to make accrual earnings management become more limited. Third, forecasts from analysts is an important factor to make firms conduct accounting numbers manipulation. Firms with meeting or missing forecasts would have more motivations to engage in it. Last, the interaction terms among events, analysts’ variables and firms’ characteristics have impact on earnings management. Those missing forecasts, high-profit and large firms have more incentives to manipulate earnings before repurchasing and M&A with stock payment for acquirers.

參考文獻


Anagnostopoulou, S.C. and Tsekrekos, A.E., 2015. Earnings Management in Firms Seeking to Be Acquired, British Accounting Review 47, 351-375.
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