This study examines how the split share structure reform affects cash holdings in Chinese listed firms. The sample comprises Chinese listed firms from 2001 to 2011. Our empirical results show that firms hold excess cash because of the higher precautionary motive after the reform. However, firms increased cash holdings in order to save for future investment opportunities rather than as a consequence of financial constraints. Furthermore, the agency motive of cash holdings was lower for managers than for controlling shareholders before the reform, and both decreased after the reform. We also divided the whole sample into state-controlled and non-state-controlled firms to compare the impacts of the reform on cash holdings of these two different types of firms. The results show that the precautionary motive for holding cash was higher in state-controlled firms than in non-state-controlled firms before the reform, but became indifferent after the reform. The agency motive of managers for holding excess cash was higher for non-state-controlled firms than for state-controlled firms in both pre-reform and post-reform period.