融資來源對中國上市公司盈餘管理的影響

Source of financing and earnings management：Evidence from Chinese listed companies

李尉慈(Wei-tzu Li)

指導教授 ： 洪榮華 ； 陳香如

國立中央大學/管理學院/企業管理學系/碩士(2011年)

摘要

考量中國大陸與其他國家公司治理環境之差異，再加上其特有的「軟預算約束(soft budget constraint)」問題，本研究以1997年到2008年之中國上市公司作為研究對象，除探討融資來源對中國上市公司盈餘管理行為之影響外，亦檢測在制度改革前後其盈餘管理行為是否具有顯著的變化。
Panel Least Squares迴歸分析的結果發現，在銀行業股份制改革前，當公司以銀行貸款為融資增加來源時，兩種盈餘管理指標皆顯著較少，顯示在軟預算約束下，經理人不用擔心財務績效不佳所帶來的籌資問題，盈餘管理的行為較少；而改革後，僅裁決性應計數相較於改革前有顯著上升，但非營業損益卻顯著減少，顯示銀行業股份制改革可抑制公司負債融資時使用非營業損益盈餘管理的行為，而裁決性應計數盈餘管理的增多，則顯示出銀行業股份制改革後上市公司預算的硬化。其次，在權益融資相關法規調整前，當上市公司的融資來源來自權益融資時，兩種盈餘管理指標衡量皆顯著較多，顯示使用權益增資時，管理者為了達到發行門檻或是在利益輸送誘因下，會有盈餘管理的傾向；而2001年證券監督管理委員會調整權益融資法規後，上市公司利用裁決性應計數進行盈餘管理的情形顯著增加，但使用非營業損益盈餘管理的行為並無顯著改變，顯示以會計數據為依據的權益融資法規會引導上市公司盈餘管理的行為。本研究之實證結果希望能提供新興市場政策研擬時的參考，以及作為投資者評估中國上市公司盈餘品質時的參考依據。

關鍵字

盈餘管理 ； 裁決性應計數 ； 非營業損益 ； 軟預算約束 ； 融資來源

並列摘要

Considering the differences of corporate governance environment between China and other countries and its soft budget constraint problems, this study investigates the relationship between sources of financing and earnings management behavior, using China’s listed corporations from 1997 to 2008 as sample observations.
We use Panel Least Squares regression to examine our hypotheses and the results are as follows: First, before the banking reform, companies, which had high debt financing, had significantly less discretionary accruals and non-operating income, suggesting that managers have weaker incentives to manipulate earnings under the condition of soft budget constraint. However, after banking reform, only the use of discretionary accruals significantly increases, the use of non-operating income significantly decreases. These results indicate that banking reform can mitigate the incentives of earnings management by the use of non-operating income when listed companies increase debt financing. On the other hand, the increase in the use of discretionary accruals suggests that soft budget constraint problems have been alleviated after banking reform. Second, our empirical evidence shows that earnings management is positively related to rights issues during 1997-2000, suggesting that in order to exceed the threshold of rights issues, managers tend to manipulate earnings. In 2001, China Securities Regulatory Commission revised its rights issues regulations. We find that the use of discretionary accruals to manage earnings significantly increases. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the use of non-operating income decreases after these adjustments. These results indicate that regulations about rights issues based on accounting numbers indeed lead to earnings management behavior. Our research has implications for emerging markets when making policies and for investors who assess the accounting quality of China’s listed firms.

並列關鍵字

soft budget constraint ； source of financing ； non-operating income ； discretionary accruals ； earnings management

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