本研究旨在應用否決者理論觀點,探討我國國民年金法的產出過程,其出發點是希望能藉此解釋為何我國全民健保制度在1994年即完成立法,但帶動我國福利國論戰的國民年金制度,卻直到2007年才完成立法?且為何不能如全民健保般將所有國民納入國民年金中?近來福利發展理論中備受矚目的否決機制相關理論,以George Tsebelis所提出之否決者理論最為著名,在當代的政治學及比較制度學中,相當受到討論,研究途徑主要是透過分析政治制度與各行為者的偏好,來確認誰是否決者,且他們之間如何互動而影響政策產出,研究內容是重程序而輕實體(政策內容)。台灣學術界運用有關否決者理論於公共政策之探討尚不多見,特別是社會政策的領域,本研究希望能填補此研究領域之不足。 本文運用否決者理論觀點,先從縱剖的面向,分4個時期敘述我國國民年金法產出的歷史過程,再從橫剖的面向,對各個時期、各行動者做權力、偏好及整體否決者結構的分析。為能運用該理論觀點,本文首先依我國憲法明文規定及法案通過流程,找出制度型否決者,其次透過對各行動者可以掌握的政治權力及偏好作分析,進一步探討黨派型與其他可能否決者之角色。最後,運用否決者理論的吸收法則進行合併後,說明否決者之空間結構。本研究顯示,透過我國政治制度否決者數目、偏好距離及其內部凝聚力之深入分析,似比其他福利發展理論更具解釋我國國民年金法為何選擇了今日的年金制度,以及為何一再地延宕立法時間之原因。
The Purpose of this study is application the veto players theory viewpoint to explore the outcome of Taiwan’s National Pension making process. To start off the point is be able to explain why Taiwan’s National Health Insurance Institution could complete legislative in 1994, however, the National Pension Institution which was stimulating dispute for Taiwan Welfare State issue were completed legislative until in 2007? and what reasons for that can not bring all national into it? Recently, the orientation of veto mechanism was to getting more attentively in Welfare Develop Theory, especially for George Tsebelis’s Veto Players Theory. It is quite discussing in modern political science and the study of comparative institution. The research approach is mainly analysis through of polity institution and preference of all actors to identify those who are veto players, and how to interaction between them to influence policy outcome. The study is noticeable on process rather than policy content. Taiwan’s academic community have been seldom application veto players theory to discuss in public policy, especially in the field of social policy, this study is hope to fill the shortage of this field. The veto player theory uses in this study while starting from vertical dimention to divided 4 stages which describing the historical outcomes of Taiwan’s National Pension act process. And then, analyzing the actors’s power、preference and whole veto players theory structure in every stage from cross section. In order to apply this theory, firstly, according to Taiwan’s Constitution regulation and the legislative passing process identify those who are institutional veto players. Secondly, through for analyzing various actors who can control the political power and preference to further explore the role of partisan and other type veto players. Finally, application the absorption rule to combine in veto players theory, next to illustration veto players spatial structure. This study shows that in depth analyzing the numbers of Taiwan’s political institution、distance of preference and internal cohesion, it seems that more than other Welfare Developing Theory to explain the reason why Taiwan’s National Pension Institution forming today’s content and then why repeatedly delayed the legislative time.
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