多重代理問題與外部董事獨立性之相關研究

Multiple Principle-Agent and Independence of Outside Director

張舒綺(Shu-chi Chang)

指導教授 ： 陳俊宏

朝陽科技大學/管理學院/會計所/碩士(2012年)

摘要

有鑑於董事會監督機制與資訊透明度為有效減緩代理問題之衡量指標，藉此本文探討企業在設置外部董事會機制下，第一：是否會降低代理問題的可能性，第二：對於內部董事從事掏空資產的行為下，外部董事是否善盡職責、執行監督之理論分析。本文之研究結論茲歸納如下：一、由於不具獨立性之外部董事並未發揮監督功能，並且僅擁有給予主理人報酬的控制權數。因此，外部董事若要避免主理人有自利動機從事掏空資產行為或是代理問題，則外部董事將會設置誘因契約亦或激勵性報酬以間接控制主理人，使主理人與股東利益一致，進而提升公司績效。二、主理人在設置代理人的底薪制度時，存在著三種不同結果。三、在具有獨立性外部董事的監督下，內部董事從事掏空資產前，會事先衡量資產權益比重及被外部董事查核發現受到懲罰之因素，決定是否進行掏空資產。四、在外部董事嚴謹的監督下，內部董事可能因自利動機而與代理人產生利益勾結，但內部董事基於法律的制裁，其會依據與代理人勾結前和勾結後，被外部董事查核發現機率的大小而進行掏空資產。

關鍵字

賽局 ； 獨立性 ； 外部董事 ； 代理問題

並列摘要

Considering that board of directors to reduce the agency problem is efficiency measurement indicators. Therefore, in this paper analyze the settings of the external board of directors. The first, it will reduce the possibility of agency problems. The second, internal directors emptied of assets, the theoretical analysis of whether to execute the supervision of outside directors. In this paper, conclusions can be summarized as follows：The first, as the non-independence of outside directors did not exercise an oversight and only have to give principal a control of reward. Therefore, the outside directors is avoid to principal have self-serving motives in hollowed assets or agent problem, the outside directors will set the incentive contract or incentive compensation to indirect control of the principal, principal with the interests of shareholders consistent, and enhance corporate performance. Second, when principal set the agent''s basic salary system, we have got three different results. Third, under the supervision of independent outside directors, inside directors engaged in hollowed assets, will consider their own profits and the impact of legal sanctions, and then decide to emptied assets. Fourth, under the strict supervision of outside directors, inside directors may be self-serving motives and agents of interest arising from collusion. Due to inside directors is based on legal sanctions, inside directors will be based on the agent collusion and collusion, the outside directors found that the size of the probability of and hollowed assets.

並列關鍵字

Game theory. ； Agent problem ； Board of directors ； Auditor independent

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