股權結構、關係人交易與公司財務績效關聯性之研究

The Relationship among Ownership Structure, Related Party Transaction and Corporate Finance Performance

莊嘉建(Jia-Jian Chuang) ； 呂佩蓉(Pei-Rong Lu)

《蘭陽學報》 7期 (2008/06) Pp. 86-94

https://doi.org/10.6665/JLYIT.2008.7.86

摘要

近年來國內外相繼爆發企業舞弊案件，公司治理(Corporate Governance)議題逐漸受到各界重視。因此在新興市場中，外部公司治理機制功能相當薄弱，只能偏重內部公司治理機制，來確保管理者的行為，與股東和債權人所關注的目標一致，以降低代理問題。
本研究則是針對股權結構及關係人交易二大構面來探討其與公司財務績效之關聯性，以供作為制定公司治理機制之參考。選取2002年到2006年共五年的上市電子業公司為實證對象，採用迴歸分析目的在於分析內部人持股比例、大股東持股比例、法人機構持股比例、董監事質押比例，以及關係人交易等變數對公司財務績效(Tobinq)之影響，並進一步探討其在董事會規模、公司規模之下是否有所不同，來健全公司的治理機制。實證結果顯示內部人持股比例、大股東持股比例、法人機構持股比例對公司財務績效呈現正相關。董監事質押比例、關係人交易等變數對公司財務績效呈現負相關。

關鍵字

公司治理 ； 股權結構 ； 關係人交易 ； 董監事質押比例 ； 資產報酬率

並列摘要

For recently years, inland and abroad have happened corporate fraud, Corporate Governance purpose come on attach importance to everybody .In emerging market, outside corporate Governance function infirm, just emphasis inside Corporate Governance to insure management behave will agree with shareholder and creditor target, to decrease agency problem.
This study exame relationship among Ownership Structure, Related Party transaction and Corporate Finance Performance for make Corporate Governance. This model is applied to the data of the Taiwan stock market for 2002-2006. We will apply linear regression models to analysis Insider ownership、Black-holders ownership、Institutional ownership Ratio of mortgaged/pledged shares of directors supervisors and related party transaction effect on performance, and then discuss under board of directors size、corporate size have some different to healthiness Corporate Governance The empirical results are summarized as follows: Insider ownership、Black-holders ownership、Institutional ownership have significant positive impact on performance(Tobin's q). Ratio of mortgaged/pledged shares of directors and supervisors and related party transaction have a significant negative impact on performance as a whole.

並列關鍵字

Corporate Governance ； ownership structure Related Party Transaction Ratio of mortgaged/pledged shares of directors and supervisors ； ROA

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