This study investigates whether the relation between share segmentation system and dividend preferences is moderated by split share structure reform. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we determine the following: first, the split share structure reform negatively moderates the cash dividend preference of nonnegotiable shareholders. Moreover, the negative moderating effects of the reform cause legal person shareholders change their preferences from cash to stock dividends while state shareholders still prefer cash dividends. Finally, the reform changes the attitude of the second largest shareholders, from cooperating with to monitoring controlling shareholders, with these monitoring effects mainly coming from state shareholders.
為了持續優化網站功能與使用者體驗,本網站將Cookies分析技術用於網站營運、分析和個人化服務之目的。
若您繼續瀏覽本網站,即表示您同意本網站使用Cookies。