Title

企業人力資源工齡買斷的博弈分析

Translated Titles

Analysis of Game on Layoff Mechanism for Human Resource in Enterprise

Authors

雷勇(Yong Lei);蒲勇健(Yong-Jian Pu)

Key Words

需求不足 ; 工齡買斷 ; 定價博弈 ; Nash均衡 ; shortage of demand ; the layoff mechanism ; the game on the price ; Nash equilibrium

PublicationName

重慶大學學報(自然科學版)

Volume or Term/Year and Month of Publication

28卷3期(2005 / 03 / 01)

Page #

132 - 135

Content Language

簡體中文

Chinese Abstract

在產品市場需求不足條件下,產品的價格就會降低,引起企業經濟效益的滑坡,對此,企業需要調整經營計劃與決策,解雇一些產出價值低於工資投入的績效較差的員工,企業買斷計劃提供員工自願離開企業的有效途徑,只要員工離職後到企業外部謀生所得報酬總值超過員工在需求不足下的產出價值總和,買斷計畫可以實施;在買斷過程中涉及到企業與員工就買斷最後定價的經濟博弈問題,在假設爭議雙方能互相協商談判解決分歧形成一致價格和不能就價格達成共識情況下,分別討論爭議雙方的博弈行為,得到Nash均衡解以及雙方所持的均衡戰略,當存在仲裁第三方定價時,爭議雙方對仲裁方定價信念的不確定程度對均衡結果有直接和重要影響。

English Abstract

Under the conditions of shortage of demand on goods, the prices of goods and the economic benefit of enterprise will fall. The enterprise should adjust management and decision-making and some employees whose output values are lower than their wages from the enterprise will be fired. The layoff mechanism from the enterprise can provide an efficient way for these employees to leave voluntarily. As long as the total value of reword outward of the enterprise can exceed their total output values, the layoff mechanism can be put in practice. There is the economic game on the final price for the layoff during the process. In the cases of reaching consistent agreement on it or not between the employees and the enterprise, the results of game such as Nash equilibrium and stratagem are respectively discussed. The degree of uncertainty of the faith on the price from the arbitrator will affect largely the equilibrium when the arbitrator is involved.

Topic Category 基礎與應用科學 > 基礎與應用科學綜合
工程學 > 工程學綜合