Two-Level Games Between Rival Regimes: Domestic Politics and the Remaking of Cross-Strait Relations




Jin-Wen Lin

Key Words

two-level games ; Robert D. Putnam ; cross-Strait relations ; linkage politics ; democratic peace


Issues & Studies

Volume or Term/Year and Month of Publication

36卷6期(2000 / 11 / 01)

Page #

1 - 26

Content Language


English Abstract

This article develops a two-level game model to depict the sovereignty dispute across the Taiwan Strait. It shows that dissatisfaction with the status quo undermines cross-Strait stability, and that a moderate leader besieged by hard-liners in a nondemocratic regime reacts most radically to external pressures. These arguments are then empirically verified. Such findings deviate from Robert Putnam’s claim that international cooperation is enhanced by a greater domestic demand to change the status quo, and also call for a distinction between two-level games that are zero-sum and nonzero-sum. By implication, the author suggests that cross-Strait stability can be improved by concurrent power transitions, centripetal political institutions, and a nonzero-sum distribution of payoffs.

Topic Category 社會科學 > 政治學
Times Cited
  1. 傅澤民(2009)。權力不對等之互動結構與小國面對強鄰的策略選擇:古巴、斯里蘭卡和台灣。臺灣大學政治學研究所學位論文。2009。1-219。 
  2. 許淑幸(2005)。兩岸互動制度化之研究。臺灣大學國家發展研究所學位論文。2005。1-146。 
  3. 陳毅陽(2010)。獲利可能與政黨偏好:台灣農漁民對兩岸經貿的立場分析。政治大學東亞研究所學位論文。2010。1-54。