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黨團協商機制:從制度化觀點分析

Party Negotiation Mechanism: An Analysis through the Lens of Institutionalization

摘要


本文欲以制度化的觀點來評估黨團協商機制,希望回答以下研究問題:首先,黨團協商機制是否被頻繁的使用,以去解決重大爭議,且黨團協商機制解決重大爭議是否有效;其次,黨團協商機制的規則與程序是否依照普遍性原則來規律地執行,不因個案或個人(尤其是立法院長)的意志而有差別;第三,黨團協商機制是否被政治行動者所普遍認同,是一個具有價值的存在。本文以第八屆立法院為分析的基礎,使用的方法包括:對於立法院提案的內容分析,以就實際面去觀察黨團協商應用的狀況以及其效果;其次是對立委的深入訪談與對立委助理的調查訪問,期望如此得以從政治行動者的角度看他們對於黨團協商的看法。研究結果顯示,首先,在實務運作上,黨團協商機制相較於記名表決,已經成為最常被用來處理立法院爭議的機制,而且是爭議法案要通過三讀的關鍵因素;其次更重要的是,黨團協商機制獲得政治行動者,包括多數黨、少數黨與小黨的認同,這有利於黨團協商的制度化。然而,黨團協商在實務運作上並未完全遵照協商期一個月的規定,且立法院院長的意志與判斷,也決定了相當一部份法案是否被交付協商,以及協商成敗的命運,也就是說,黨團協商在實務運作上並沒有完全按照普遍性原則來運作,因此尚未達到制度化的標準。

並列摘要


This research empirically examines the institutionalization of the party negotiation mechanism in Taiwan's Legislative Yuan. Utilizing data of legislative initiatives from the 8th Legislative Yuan, in-depth interviews with legislators and a survey of legislators’ staffs, we investigate how often the party negotiation mechanism is adopted to settle partisan conflicts, whether it is used in accordance with the laws and finally, whether it is widely recognized and valued as a key mechanism in the policy-making process. The findings show that the party negotiation mechanism has been recognized by parties and legislators as a major pathway to resolve disputes within the Legislative Yuan. In practice, the party negotiation mechanism is applied much more frequently than voting. A successful negotiation is almost a guarantee of successful legislation. Moreover, a considerable portion of political actors within the Legislative Yuan, including those from the majority party, the minority party and small parties, approve of the utility of negotiation, which helps the institutionalization of the party negotiation mechanism. Yet, the practice of this mechanism has not been stabilized, and its application has not completely followed the statutes. The Speaker of the Legislative Yuan also has the discretion to determine the operation and hence, the outcomes of party negotiation meetings. According to our findings, it might be too early to say that this mechanism has been institutionalized.

參考文獻


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被引用紀錄


賴綉琪(2017)。從2016年臺灣「電業法」修法過程看總統的立法影響力〔碩士論文,國立臺灣大學〕。華藝線上圖書館。https://doi.org/10.6342%2fNTU201704083

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