論政府管制：一個政治經濟學的觀點

On State Regulation: A Political Economy Perspective

蔡中民(Chung-Min Tsai)

《政治學報》 57期 (2014/06) Pp. 31-51

https://doi.org/10.6229/CPSR.2014.57.02

摘要

本文透過分析與比較政府管制的兩種模式－法規性管制及獨立管制機關、國有化與公有財產權－說明「國家－市場」關係的變化並探索近年來前者興起的原因。本文認為後者的效率低下與權責不清是制度崩壞的主因，最終迫使國家推動民營化，並逐步採納前者的制度設計。前者的優勢在於當國家面對以私有財產為主的市場體制發展時，積極參與並扮演一個公正裁判的角色得以促進市場競爭與改善效率。建立獨立管制機關與相應的法規體系可降低政治介入市場時所造成的不確定性與強化政策的可信度，也可避免政策因政治人物的偏好與更迭而頻繁調整。獨立管制機關的自主權得以避免行政權干涉與增加政策延續性與組織專業性，所以成為較良善且實際可行的制度設計。此外，本文檢視政府管制理論的沿革與重要議題，認為其具有三個特點：一、具體制度先於理論而出現；二、理論的發展是先規範性（normative）後實證性（positive）；三、實證理論的分析層次與途徑是先宏觀的系統論而微觀的制度論。1980年代西歐的大規模民營化促成美國式的管制體系向西擴散，進而推行至全球，提供理論更豐富的實證素材。最後，本文指出目前管制體制發展的困境與未來可行的研究方向。

關鍵字

政府管制 ； 「國家－市場」關係 ； 國有化 ； 管制理論 ； 獨立管制機關

並列摘要

By analyzing and comparing two models of state regulation: statutory regulation with independent regulatory agency and nationalization with state ownership, this article explores the rise of regulatory state in the past decades and illustrates why and how the state manages the market. It argues that the latter model was abandoned because of its low efficiency and ambiguous responsibilities. The states decided to adopt privatization and replace it with the former model, which is more applicable. When the state faces the market based on the private ownership, it plays the role of impartial referee and actively participates in the market to promote competition and improve efficiency. Setting up an autonomous regulator reduces the uncertainty caused by political intervention and strengthens policy credibility. While delegating the regulatory authority to independent regulatory agencies, the policies will not be intervened by politicians and keep stable. The autonomy of independent regulators will escape from administrative involvement and increase its expertise and policy continuity. Independent regulatory agencies are now a better and more feasible institutional design. Moreover, this article examines the development of the theories of state regulation and critical issues and proposes three distinct features. First, the empirical evidence emerged earlier than theoretical discussion. Second, the theories have shifted from normative to positive orientation. Third, the level of analysis and analytical approach have moved from macro-level systematic to micro-level institutionalist. At the end, this article points out the predicaments of the development of regulatory system and directions for future research.

並列關鍵字

state regulation ； state-market relations ； nationalization ； regulatory theories ； independent regulatory agency

參考文獻

Cushman, R. E., 1941. The Independent Regulatory Commissions. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

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Hotelling, H., 1938. “The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates.” Econometrica, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 242-269.

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