多數研究災後重建的地方治理文獻,偏重在社區觀察與重建程序的歸納。然對於真正影響重建方式與資源分配效率的政治經濟因素及分配機制,卻缺乏深入的討論。本文應用複雜公共利益理論(sophisticated public interest theory),以1999年921地震災後重建為例,詮釋政府部門的災後重建資源分配決策。透過三個步驟的迴歸分析,發現影響政府重建經費分配的重要因素,是兼具損失導向(loss-based)與資源重分配效應的補助模式。來自地方的政治利益團體,可能透過遊說或資源爭取過程,主導政府重建資源配置的選擇行為,而導致重建資源產生重分配與損失復原的效應。此政治經濟運作過程,不但可能因而降低地方自動從事減災與避免在災害敏感地開發的誘因,亦會犧牲重建資源分配的經濟效率。
Previous researches that investigate the local governance of post-disaster recovery were mainly focused on the recovery procedures induction and the community activity observations from limited disaster event samples. However, these works lacked detailed discussion of the political economic factors and resource distribution mechanism that would determine the post-disaster recovery procedures choice and the efficiency of resource allocation. This article applied a sophisticated public interest model to explain the governmental decision-making process associated with the post-disaster recovery resources allocation. A three-step regression method is designed to conduct an empirical analysis by using the data with respect to the governmental subsidies allocation following the 921 Chi-Chi Earthquake in 1999. The results indicate that the governmental post-disaster subsidies allocation is not only based on a loss-based rule but also presenting a resource reallocation effect. Once the recovery plans were introduced, the locally political interest groups played an important role in determining the reallocation of resources. This process may decrease the incentives for local authorities to adopt hazard migration measures or to reduce land development in hazard-prone areas. This phenomenon would also decrease the economic efficiency of governmental post-disaster recovery resource allocation.