無財源提供強制責任在財政聯邦主義之角色－兼論“無財源提供強制責任改革法”的內容與執行成效

The Role of Unfunded Mandates in Fiscal Federalism and the Contents and Effectiveness of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act

張育哲(Yu-Che Chang)

《公共事務評論》 7卷2期 (2006/12) Pp. 89-114

https://doi.org/10.29622/JPAR.200612.0005

摘要

財政聯邦主義一直是府際間關係變化最為主要的核心議題。本文首先檢視財政聯邦主義自新政以來在府際關係各個歷史階段的變異。透過近幾年美國聯邦與州政府財務問題的審視與財政政策的論述，發現在二十一世紀之初無財源提供強制責任的運用再次成為美國聯邦與各州之間爭議的焦點。
其次，本文對「無財源提供強制責任改革法」進行分析。該法的主要架構係針對無財源提供強制責任的運用，在立法、行政、司法等政府部門分別賦予非強制性的程序要求，以期能盡可能降低對於下級政府的財政衝擊。其中，國會預算局在立法程序中，負責對無財源提供強制責任造成的州與地方財務衝擊進行評估，為最重要的角色。並且，一般認為其運作的成果相當成功。但相形之下，該法對於行政規則制定程序的要求，卻似乎無法達到預期的效果。

關鍵字

中央請客地方買單 ； 無財源提供強制責任 ； 地方財政 ； 財政聯邦主義 ； 府際關係

並列摘要

Fiscal federalism has always been the focal point of intergovernmental relations. This study examines how the role of fiscal federalism has changed during the various stages of intergovernmental relations. By reviewing the fiscal problems of the American federal and state governments over the past few years, it is found that unfunded mandates have once again become the most controversial intergovernmental issue in the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Furthermore, this study scrutinizes the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act. It is found that this Act constructs nonbinding procedural requirements for legislative, administrative, and judicial branches of government respectively for the utilization of unfunded mandates. In general, it is agreed that the Congressional Budget Office has played the most important role in assessing the fiscal impacts of mandates deliberated in the Congress. Nevertheless, the implementation of this Act is not as successful in the administrative rule-making process.

並列關鍵字

Local government pays for central government's bill ； Unfunded mandates ； Local public finance ； Fiscal federalism ； Intergovernmental relations