從《入中論》遮破「唯識無境」探討空有之爭

On the Debate of the Antithesis of Emptiness and Being: Refuting the Consciousness-only from "Madhyamakāvatāra's" Viewpoint

釋傳法(Chuan-Fa Shih)

《玄奘佛學研究》 21期 (2014/03) Pp. 213-237

摘要

本文針對《入中論》卷六第48至71偈頌部分，綜觀月稱遮破「唯識無境」之論辯內容與方式，探討整理月稱評破唯識無境的理由，試就唯識學派的立場進行回應。應成派的歸謬法以不立自宗、以破為立為方法，在第48至71偈頌中，月稱根據中觀「否定自性」的根本立場，本著「緣起」與「自性」背反的見地，展開緣起的論法，徹底地難破破唯識無境的論辯。不過顯然，唯識宗是不認為有被難破的。因為空有二宗於「自性」的理解、於「緣起」的解讀不同，因此月稱據其性空緣起宗義展開論辯，可說沒有說服彼宗的效果。就雙方辯論的內容觀之，兩大學系立論大本的不同，有其根本性的歧見。

關鍵字

入中論 ； 緣起 ； 自性 ； 空有之爭 ； 唯識

並列摘要

This paper discusses the debate in Madhyamakāvatāra, Vol. 6, from 48 to 71 gathas, where Candrakīrti refuted the arguments of ”the Consciousnessonly School,” and the reasons he refuted the Consciousness-only arguments. The author tries to respond as the position of Consciousness-only school. The proof by contradiction is applied by Prāsavgika, which Candrakīrti used; further, in the basic principals of ”not building its subject” and ”refuting is proving,” Candrakīrti, with the insight of the antithesis of both dependent origination and self-being, completely refuted the Consciousness-only arguments. But obviously, the Consciousness-only School does not consider itself being refuted; this is because both schools have different definitions on ”self-being” and dependent origination. So Candrakīrti's arguments could be considered as no persuasion. To view from the content of both sides, both schools have their fundamental disagreements rooted in their standpoints.

並列關鍵字

Madhyamakāvatāra ； dependent origination ； self-being ； the antithesis of Emptiness and Being ； Consciousness-only

參考文獻

劉嘉誠(2005)。月稱的「緣起」義。佛學研究中心學報。10

《中論》，《大正藏》冊30

《唯識三十頌》，《大正藏》冊31

(1991)。國際佛學譯粹。台北:國際佛學研究中心。

佛光大辭典。