RESIGNATION MONETIZING OF EXECUTIVES IN LISTED COMPANIES: INSTITUTIONAL REASONS, THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CONSEQUENCES AND COUNTERMEASURE
Chao-Qun Shen；Wangjian Zhou；Liang Liang
GEM Capital Markets Equity Incentive ； Executives Resignation ； Evaluate Operating ； Performance Growth
|Volume or Term/Year and Month of Publication||
13卷1期（2016 / 03 / 01）
35 - 42
Senior executives of listed companies are the backbone of the companies and playing important roles in the companies' sustainable growth and stability. Recent years, however, the quantities of executives have resigned from their positions, which not only reflected the side effects of the current Equity incentive system, but exposed some defects in China's capital market system settings and regulatory aspects. In this paper, we find that the phenomenon of the GEM executives' resignations show a strong correlation to the distribution system and pricing institutional, which is called＂ three high＂ problem of the capital market by study of GEM-listed companies. In addition, resignation Monetizing of Executives leave a negative Influence to the company's operating performance. The final result is briefly summarized and put forward some practicable policy recommendations.
社會科學 > 管理學