應用賽局模型計算協同式恐怖攻擊威脅值並有效動員安全部隊

A Game Theory Approach for Evaluating Coordinated Terror Gunfire Threat and Deploying Security Forces

吳正光(C. K. Wu) ； 陳奕明(Y. M. Cheng) ； 吳大任(D. Wu)

《危機管理學刊》 9卷1期 (2012/03) Pp. 27-38

https://doi.org/10.6459/JCM.201203_9(1).0003

摘要

現今恐怖攻擊為迅速達成大規模破壞，漸有協同化的趨勢。在孟買攻擊中，恐怖份子發動多起槍擊事件，有些攻擊的目的是分散維安部隊指揮官注意力，使得主要鎖定的目標中造成大量的傷亡。當都會區反擊的資源有限時，維安部隊指揮官必須重新思考：如何重新分配可用的維安部隊，以有效抵抗分散式的攻擊。本研究提出了一個兩階段、整合式的賽局模型，第一階段在每一起發生槍擊事件中，將維安部隊指揮官和恐怖份子之間的互動行為模式化在一個零和賽局，將每個賽局的恐怖份子期望報酬，當作一個槍擊事件的攻擊威脅值，並計算這些威脅值的門檻值。第二個階段利用所有發生槍擊事件的攻擊威脅值及門檻值，計算每一個槍擊事件的夏普利值。然後依據這些夏普利值重新配置維安部隊數量，以對抗協同化恐怖攻擊。數值模擬結果顯示：本研究建構的模型處理大規模協同式的槍擊事件比平均分配的方法需要較少成本。

關鍵字

分散式恐怖攻擊 ； 維安部隊配置 ； 混合策略納許均衡 ； 夏普利值

並列摘要

In Mumbai attacks, terrorists coordinate to launch multiple diversionary gunfire events. The diversionary attacks are designed to divert the attention of the security forces in order to cause them to take a longer time to respond. This in turn enables the terrorists to cause more casualties at their main target. It is important to efficiently reallocate the available security forces to meet these terrorist attacks, especially when the available resources are limited. In this paper we proposed two game theory-based models for the reallocation of security forces for the purpose of countering both primary and diversionary attacks in an urban environment. The first model is used each target and the ”attack on hidden-object game” in which one analyzes the interaction behavior between the security force commander and the terrorists within a zero-sum game. The terrorist threat value to this target is derived from the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. The second model utilizes all these terrorist threat values to compute the Shapley value for each target, in terms of the majority of all terrorist threat values for attacks. The Shapley values are then used to create a reallocated set of the security forces. Experimental results show the approach proposed in this study is more efficient than the average method for dealing with ever more likely gunfire events.

並列關鍵字

Terrorist diversionary attack ； Security forces reallocation ； Nash equilibrium ； Shapley value

參考文獻

Raymond Thibodeaux (2008), “Mumbai Terrorists Aided by Security Lapses, Technology” VOA News, Voice of America

http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O63-diversionaryattack.html

Berkovitz, L. D.,Dresher, M.(1959).A Game-Theory Analysis of Tactical Air War.Operations Research.7(5),599-620.

Dixit, A.,Skeath, S.(2001).Games of Strategy.W. W. Norton & Company.

Mishra, D.,Rangarajan, B.(2005).Cost Sharing in a Job Scheduling Problem Using the Shapley Value.Proc. of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce.(Proc. of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce).