家族企業專業經營與信用風險模型之實證研究

CEO Power and Credit Risk Models on Family Firms: Evidence from Taiwan

吳克(Ko Wu) ； 余惠芳(Hui-Fun Yu) ； 陳文郎(Daniel-Wl Chen) ； 林美娟(Mei-Chuan Lin)

《全球管理與經濟》 7卷2期 (2011/12) Pp. 1-19

https://doi.org/10.6565/JGME.2011.7(2).1

摘要

本文利用統計方法建構家族企業信用風險模型（Credit Risk Models），考慮家族企業當經營權（Management）與所有權（Ownership）分開產生之代理問題（Agency Problem），找出專業經理人（Chief Executive Officer, CEO）專業經營（CEO Power）影響公司績效之顯著變數。期能提供投資人、金融機構及利害關係人（Stakeholders），事前預測可能發生財務風險（Financial Risk）之機率，降低財務風險損失（Financial Risk Loss），進而增加公司價值（Corporate Value）。實證分析上，利用K-S test，M-U test以及建立Logistic信用風險模型。實證結果發現，當經營權與所有權分開，CEO專業經營，影響公司績效有財務結構、償債能力、經營能力、獲利能力、現金流量與公司治理指標，儘早降低借款依存度，以減少財務風險發生的機率，提高公司價值；降低流動比率與內部保留比率，因應資產變現損失的安全邊際；專業經理人（CEO）重視會計師（CPAs）查核意見，外部監控（Outsider Monitoring）與公司治理能力（Corporate Governance Power）增強，提高公司績效。因此，本文之實證價值與管理意涵，家族企業專業經營重視外部人（Outsiders）會計師查核意見，外部監控能力增強，可降低代理問題，提高家族企業公司治理能力與公司價值。

關鍵字

專業經營 ； 代理問題 ； 信用風險模型 ； 公司價值

並列摘要

The objective of this study is to use statistical methods to construct a credit risk models in family firms, discussed the agency problem on management and ownership separated. That made it be possible to predict in advance the probability of family firms CEO power, for investors, financial institutes and stakeholders to estimate financial risks, so that financial risk losses can be minimized while corporate value can be improved. For empirical analysis, K-S test, M-U test and logistic credit risk models were established, and to determine variables that can significantly affect corporate performance and enhance corporate value. Our empirical results suggest that having different persons assuming the role of the chairperson of the board and the CEO can affect corporate performance in terms of the financial structure, solvency, operating performance, profitability, cash flow and corporate governance. Therefore, for companies with separated ownership and management, the following issues have to be aware of First, reduce the debt-to-equity ratio as early as possible to reduce the financial risk while increasing the corporate value. Secondly, reduce the liquidity ratio and the retention ratio to meet the margin of safety for assets realization loss. Third, the CEO should pay attention to opinions from CPA audit, and the outsider monitoring and corporate governance capacity have to be enhanced for elevating corporate performance. Therefore, the empirical value and the managerial implication of this study is that the CEOs of family firms should value opinions from outsiders CPA audits and outsider monitoring in order to reduce agency problems and elevate corporate governance power and corporate value.

並列關鍵字

CEO Power ； Agency Problem ； Credit Risk Models ； Corporate Value