This paper analyzes the risk-adjusted behavior of mutual fund managers on the basis of tournament concept. The competitive environment and the reward structure make the managers attempt to maximize their expected compensation. During the assessment period, they may revise the risk level or alter the composition of portfolio to achieve the aims. Such risk-adjusted behavior might not serve the best interest to mutual fund investors. The evidence suggests that managers with poor performance will become aggressive, and they tend to increase the portfolio volatility toward the end of the annual assessment period. This result is more obvious for small and younger mutual funds. It is also involved with the investors' myopic of an assessment to the managers' performance.
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