Title

莊子認識論和相關學說新探

Translated Titles

Zhuangzi's Epistemology and Related Doctrines: New inquiries

DOI

10.6743/NAJ.201908_36.0001

Authors

劉榮錦(LAU , Wing Kam Raymond)

Key Words

莊子的認識論 ; 莊子與相對主義 ; 莊子與不可知論 ; 「真知」 ; 庖丁解牛 ; 體道 ; Zhuangzi's epistemology ; Zhuangzi and unknowability ; Zhuangzi and relativism ; "true knowledge" (zhenzhi) ; paodingjieniu (Paoding's dismemberment of a cattle) ; tidao

PublicationName

新亞學報

Volume or Term/Year and Month of Publication

36卷(2019 / 08 / 01)

Page #

1 - 47

Content Language

繁體中文

Chinese Abstract

《莊子》說「不知之知」等,又對是非爭辯提出質疑,但莊子不是不可知論者,相反,他相信真理。他所有立說,包括提出上述質疑,都建基於對認知的肯定。對認知予以肯定的莊子之所以提出上述質疑,是由他的人生哲學所決定的。外物的莊子厭惡智巧(含機心地運用心智),他認為之所以出現是非之爭,純粹產生自智巧所帶來的偏見,所以,如果能去除機心從而消除偏見,便不會出現是非之爭,而人便能得出不含是非爭辯的究極真理。機心這個價值判斷構成了莊子整個認識論的出發點,而就是這個出發點注定了該理論最終要失敗。有一種流行觀點從認識論角度把體道誤解為對究極真理的體認。其實,體道不是關於真理的。雖然莊子對認知予以肯定,他的終極理想是超越認知。當人不把物作為認知對象,而與它們生活於經驗實踐性的關係中,人便達到與天地同遊、跟萬物無隔之道的境界。體道便是對在這境界下的生活之體驗。上述誤解緣於莊子用詞多歧義,而又偏好於以悖論形式來立論,從而使人產生不少混淆。莊子提出超越認知這個他知道不能完全實現的理想,不是要人像文盲般的無知,而是要反省人在自然界的位置。

English Abstract

Zhuangzi is popularly taken to be an anti-rationalist and a supporter of the theory of unknowability, but this is mistaken. In fact, Zhuangzi believes in truth; his whole theoretical practice, including his query of the debate of right and wrong, is premised upon an endorsement of cognitive knowing. Such a query is driven by his life philosophy. Contemptuous of the pursuit of power and material things, Zhuangzi detests cleverness (zhiqiao), that is, the use of intelligence with an improper motive. In his view, improper motives inevitably bring prejudice (chengxin), and it is prejudice that leads to the debate of right and wrong. Hence, if people can do away with improper motives, thereby eliminating prejudice, they will be able to arrive at the ultimate truth which is above right and wrong. As a value, improper motives constitute the starting point of Zhuangzi's epistemology, and it is this very starting point that destines his entire epistemology to complete failure. Although Zhuangzi endorses cognitive knowing, his ultimate ideal is to go beyond it. When people do not treat things (nature) as cognitive objects, but simply live with them in a relationship of experiential practical contact, they will arrive at the spiritual state of Dao. Tidao is precisely the experience of living in such a state, but is commonly but mistakenly understood as arriving at a cognitive ‘ultimate truth' through some experiential revelation. This mistake has arisen from Zhuangzi's two practices which have caused much conflation: on the one hand, Zhuangzi is very loose with terminology (the term Dao has five meanings in his usage, not counting its ordinary senses); on the other, Zhuangzi has a preference for advancing arguments by means of paradoxes built upon the play of words. In putting forth the idea of Dao as a spiritual state, Zhuangzi's objective is not that people should become illiterate and ignorant, but to appeal to people to rethink humankind's position in nature.

Topic Category 人文學 > 哲學
人文學 > 宗教學
人文學 > 歷史學
人文學 > 中國文學