王陽明良知學中的「先天」與「經驗」

本文通過澄清「先天」與「經驗」的歧義，探討王陽明良知思想中道德認知能否增長、如何增長的問題。在現代陽明學研究中，「先天」既可指存有論上的「先天」，也可指道德知識來源的「先天」，也可指道德稟賦的「天生」。本文區分了本體論的「良知」與具體道德判斷的「良知」。前者是「先天」的，但後者需要結合經驗才能指導實踐。現代學界在陽明學詮釋中往往著重「先天」而避談「經驗」，然而，「經驗」可以指：（1）間接的道德知識歸納，（2）作為「事件」的良知呈現，（3）探索與試錯的歷程。對於（1），陽明偶爾有貶抑經驗的說法：批評後儒以聞見填塞良知而造成障蔽。至於（2）、（3），「經驗」具有開放性。與之相應，可以歸納出三種良知整合經驗的模式：「有機整合」、「逆覺轉化」與「由疑生悟」。本文引用馬里翁的「溢出現象」詮釋陽明的良知發竅說，引用古希臘的經驗概念以佐證陽明關於問路的「知行合一」之說所體現的經驗的開放性。

關鍵字

王陽明；良知；先天；經驗；事件

並列摘要

In what sense is liangzhi (original knowledge of the good) a priori? Is liangzhi complete and perfect in itself in guiding moral actions? If not, how does liangzhi evolve by incorporating experience? In order to answer these questions, I examine two ambiguous terms, ＂xiantian＂ (a priori/inborn) and ＂experience,＂ frequently used in the interpretations of Wang Yangming's ethics. Liangzhi as an ontological concept is a priori and is inborn in the theory of human nature, but is not perfect and complete in guiding actions in concrete ethical situations. I argue that modern commentators of Wang Yangming usually avoid using the term ＂experience＂ because their notion of ＂experience＂ is influenced by Kant's rather narrow and negative view of it. For them, experience means the totality of sense data, or second-hand knowledge, or worldly wisdom gained through the induction from past experience. I point out that there are two other senses of ＂experience＂ that are rather positive: experience as happening events, and experience as the process of trial and error. To expand the concept of experience, I borrow Jean-Luc Marion's notions of saturated phenomena and the ancient Greek notion of empeiria. Corresponding to these three senses of ＂experience, there are three modes in which liangzhi incorporates experience to develop itself and cope with ethical situations.