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  • 學位論文

強制接管法制之研究-以金融機構與公共建設之接管為例

The Legal System of Compulsory Takeovers: An Analysis of Compulsory Takeovers of Financial Institutions and Public Infrastructure

指導教授 : 陳新民
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摘要


國家角色之演變自17、18世紀之夜警國家轉變至20世紀之福利國家,人民享有更多國家給付之利益,但給付不斷擴張之結果,產生國家負荷過度之情形,因此20世紀末,出現擔保國家(Gewahrleistungsstaat)之概念,亦即,國家任務得委由私人處理。惟於私人執行公共任務有嚴重缺失導致損害公益之情形發生,國家此時即負有出面承接執行之責任,以確保公共服務之給付不予中斷,該承接責任僅具備位或補充之功能,又稱為國家最後責任或介入責任。 自民國六○至九○年代,政府對於問題金融金構之公權力介入方式之特徵有三:一、陸續修法以因應處理問題金融機構;二、主管機關多採柔性措施;三、欠缺退場機制。自民國74年之臺北十信弊案起,連續幾件社會矚目之重大金融風暴,導致民國89年之銀行法修正,賦予主管機關更多元化之權力以從事金融檢查工作,不過即令如此,民國96年仍是發生中華商銀弊案,可見金融犯罪之手法亦不段翻新,主管機關之金檢手段亦應與時俱進,隨時檢討改進。 我國強制接管公共建設之法制規範,主要為《促進民間參與公共建設法》之相關規定。強制接管之目的旨在維持公共建設服務之不中斷,並不在於懲罰民間投資公司之違約狀態,更不在於掠取民間投資公司或他人之權益。臺北市政府於96年8月間率兩百多名警力強制接管臺北小巨蛋,成為地方政府強制接管民營事業之國內首例,惟其依《臺北市市有財產委託經營管理自治條例》準用行政執行手段為接管行為時,是否符合比例原則,容有可議。又《臺北市市有財產委託經營管理自治條例》是否符合法律保留原則,亦非無爭議。再者,臺北市政府之強制接管程序,未給予被接管者陳述意見之機會,亦有違背正當法律程序。 本文最後提出六項建議:一、《促進民間參與公共建設法》對於強制接管之法制規範過於簡陋,有違法律保留原則及法明確性原則,宜儘速參酌《銀行法》之接管法制,以填補立法缺漏;二、嚴守強制接管之補充性與最後手段性;三、強制接管法律要件之嚴格解釋與類型化;四、強制接管程序應予被接管者陳述意見之機會,以落實正當法律程序之法治國(Rechtsstaat)要求;五、強制接管後之政府補償措施機制之建立;六、地方政府之強制接管行為,應由中央立法規範,以符法律保留原則。

並列摘要


The role of a state evolved from a night watchman state of the 17- 18th century to a welfare state in the 20th century, by which people enjoyed more benefits granted by the state. However, the continuously extended grants have caused an excessive load for the state, leading to the sprout of the concept of “Ensuring State” (Gewahrleistungsstaat) during the end of the 20th century, i.e., the duties of a state can be conducted by a private entity. To ensure the grants of public services without being interrupted, however, the state has the responsibility to takeover and continues the condition, when public welfare was damaged due to serious deficiency in conducting the public duties by a private entity. The responsibility of takeover, also known as “the ultimate responsibility or intervening responsibility of the state”, shall be only for purpose of backing up or supplement. Three patterns may characterize Taiwan government’s interception of the abnormal financial institutions during the period of the 1970s to 2000s: I. continuing amending the laws to deal with the abnormal financial institutions; II. Using flexible measures by the authorities; III. Lacking of a closure mechanism. Since the scandal case of Taipei Tenth Credit Cooperative in 1985, there had been several successive major financial crises that attracted the attention of the public and led to the amendment of the Banking Act in 2000, which granted the authorities more diverse power to engage in financial examination. In the light of the Chinese Bank scandal occurring in 2007, which reveals that financial crime skill is keeping renewed, the authorities’ financial examination methods also need to be improved by frequently reviews and correction. Taiwan's main legal regulation for compulsory takeover of public infrastructure is the related provisions in “Act for Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects.” Compulsory takeover aims to maintain the incessant service of public infrastructure, and is not to punish the contract violation of private investment corporations or to seize the rights and interests of private investment companies or any third party. In August, 2007, Taipei City Government compulsorily took over Taipei Arena with over two hundred policemen, which was the first case of the local government's compulsory takeover of a private enterprise in Taiwan. However, it is arguable whether its administrative execution measure in accordance with “Self-Government Ordinances of Consigned Operation and Management of Taipei Municipal Property” for takeover conformed to the principle of proportionality. Moreover, it is not uncontroversial whether “Self-Government Ordinances of Consigned Operation and Management of Taipei Municipal Property” complied with the principle of legal reservation. Furthermore, the compulsory takeover procedure of Taipei City Government did not provide the party that was taken over any opportunity to express its opinions, which also violated the due process of law. In conclusion, the study proposes six suggestions as follows: I. The regulation of compulsory takeover of “Act for Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects” is primitive and does not meet the principal of legal reservation and the principle of legal certainty. Such omission of legislation needs to be remedied as soon as possible by referring the takeover regulations provided in the Banking Act, II. The nature of compulsory takeover, the supplement and last resort, shall be strictly obeyed, III. The legal requirements of the compulsory takeover shall be strictly interpreted and typificated, IV. To realizing the requirement of due process of law under the rule of law (Rechtsstaat), the parties being taken over shall be allowed with the opportunities to express their opinions during the compulsory takeover procedure; V. The government's compensation measures and mechanism after compulsory takeover shall be established; VI. The compulsory takeover act of the local government shall be regulated by the legislation of the central government to conform to the principle of legal reservation.

參考文獻


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