股東控制權對於董事會運作之影響

我國近年來公司治理的一大改革重點便是使我國公司治理結構逐漸走向「經營權與所有權分離」，以符合當代公司治理的潮流，不論是透過修正董事身分之要件或是引進獨立董事制度，皆是立法者為達成此項目標所做出的努力。然而，在各大公司治理案件或是學者的文章中，皆指出我國公司之董事會仍然高度受到大股東的控制，現實上我國的公司治理架構僅是讓經營權與少數股東分離而已，大股東仍然高度介入公司的經營，並進一步引發大股東透過控制董事會的方式以剝削少數股東的情形。為探討我國此一公司治理問題的成因，本文首先透過檢討現行法制下有關董事選派、解任的相關規定，發現累積投票制在現實上並無法發揮促使少數股東進入董事會的目的，進而造成大股東能夠輕易地掌控整體董事會，並透過董事解任法規的漏洞或是法人董事制度下的改派權，作為自身在董事當選後對其持續施以控制力的方法。基於前述在法規分析下所提出的假設，本文接著透過台灣經濟新報TEJ資料庫中「非金融業上市櫃公司」的股權以及董事會結構資料，驗證了我國非金融業上市櫃公司確實存在「少數股東控制董事會」的情形，此處的「少數股東」係指持有公司少量股份卻控制多數表決權之股東，與前述之少數股東的定義不同，並進一步分析此一情形下所產生的垂直與水平代理成本以及相關的公司治理問題。接著，本文認為此一問題的解決方法在於透過事後追究控制股東法律責任的方式，以恫嚇其透過控制董事會的方式以剝削非控制股東利益之行為，因此本文藉由完善我國公司法上影子董事的成立標準以及義務，同時建立起完整的實質受益人揭露規範作為找出追訴對象的配套措施，使得我們能找出最終對於董事會行使控制權的自然人，並追究其相關的法律責任。

關鍵字

股東控制權；少數股東控制；累積投票制；法人董事制度；董事之解任；影子董事制度；實質受益人揭露

並列摘要

In recent years, one of the most important reforms of corporate governance in Taiwan is the gradual swing of corporate governance structure towards separating ownership and control. The reason behind this is to conform to the trend of contemporary corporate governance around the world. Efforts from the legislators to achieve this goal include revising the prerequisite of being elected directors and introducing independent directors to companies’ boards, just to name a few. Nonetheless, as scholars had pointed out, also major cases involving corporate governance had shown, despite the efforts, directors of companies in Taiwan are still highly controlled by majority shareholders. Therefore, in reality, the reform only separated the board from minority shareholders, and the majority shareholders are still highly involved in the companies’ operations, which has led to the problem of majority shareholders exploiting minority shareholders by controlling the board of directors. To explore the causes of this problem, this thesis first reviews the relevant regulations on the election and removal of directors. As result, this thesis discovered that cumulative voting fails to serve the purpose of putting minority shareholders into the companies’ boards, resulting in majority shareholders easily controlling the whole board. In addition, through the loopholes in the regulations for removal of directors and the reassignment right under Article 27 of the Company Act, the majority shareholders can continue to exert control on the directors even after they were elected. Based on the hypothesis above, this thesis verifies the existence of "minority shareholder control" in TWSE-listed non-financial companies through the ownership and board structure data provided by the TEJ database. The term "minority shareholder" in here refers to a shareholder who holds a small number of shares in a company but controls a majority of the voting rights, which is different from the definition of minority shareholder mentioned above. Further, this thesis then analyzes the vertical and horizontal agency costs and related corporate governance issues arising from this phenomenon. In conclusion, this thesis argues that trough attributing ex-post legal liability to controlling shareholders can stop them from exploiting the interests of non-controlling shareholders through the controlling of directors. Further, by redefying the elements and duties of “shadow directors”, also enacting complete regulations of beneficial owners’ disclosure can assist us in finding the natural person who is really in control, then attribute to them, the proper legal liability.

並列關鍵字

Shareholders’ control rights ； Minority controlling shareholders ； Cumulative voting ； Legal entity as corporate’s director ； Removal of directors ； Shadow directors ； Disclosing beneficial owners