行政權與立法權互動關係之研究 －以我國憲法增修後的憲政運作為例

A Study of Interaction Between The Executive Power and The Legislative Power —An Example of The Implementation of The Constitution in Taiwan and After Its Amendment

禚 宏 德(Hung-Der Tso)

指導教授 ： 邱榮舉

共同指導教授 ： 蔡良文 ； 陳顯武

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/國家發展研究所/碩士(2009年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU.2009.10062

摘要

我國在歷經七個階段修憲後，迄今共舉辦四次總統直選、六次立法委員選舉，並發生過兩次政黨輪替，其中有八年時間是處於「分立政府」的狀態，行政權與立法權皆經過重大的修正，到底目前我國行政權與立法權真正的態樣是什麼？行政與立法的權力結構關係又是如何？另外也希望針對總統與行政院長間的行政權歸屬進行靜態制度面及動態憲政運作面的研究。

本文將歷史制度主義用於行政權與立法權的研究上，分成動機、制度、變遷及結果等四個層次，將憲法靜態架構（憲法增修後之規範）與憲政現實動態（憲政運作）做相互驗證，首先研究不同修憲階段受到偶發及非預期因素（歷史結構、文化結構、社會結構）的交互影響而最後產生的憲法新規範，接著以研究新憲政體制在我國實際政治運作下的動態過程與重大憲政事件，最後則探討制度變遷的結果（行政立法權力結構關係的事實研究）。

由於行政及立法兩權為國家政治之重心，兩者良性之運作，攸關行政效率與政局穩定，因此，我國在解嚴及終止動員戡亂後，迄今一共進行了七次的修憲，其中的修正重點也是集中在調整行政權與立法權的內涵，經過近幾年來實際憲政運作後，也都呈現出一些問題與現象。本論文研究發現有「中央政府體制之屬性未定」、「我國憲政發展已漸步入正軌」、「總統權威回歸憲法之賦予」、「總統有權無責、行政院院長有責無權，違反責任政治精神」、「立法權的重要性提升，行政權必須尊重立法權」、「主導修憲政黨領導人的個人意志成了影響修憲走向的最重要因素」等六點。最後本論文也提出了五項建議，分別是「立法院與總統選舉及就職時程應調整一致」、「健全政黨政治之發展」、「取消不信任制度及解散國會機制」、「釐清總統與行政院院長之權責關係」、「總統、副總統選舉應採取絕對多數制」等。

關鍵字

行政權 ； 立法權 ； 分立政府 ； 一致政府 ； 權力分立

並列摘要

Taiwan had divided government for eight years since the country had been through seven rounds of constitutional amendments, four times of presidential elections, six times of legislative elections, and two times of changes of power. There have been significant revisions to both the executive power and the legislative power. A purpose of this research is to find out what the relationship between the executive branch and the legislative branch is? The paper also discusses whether the executive power shall fall upon the president or the premier theoretically from the perspective of the constitution and realistically based on how the Constitutional is implemented.

The paper applies historical institutionalism to the study on the executive power and the legislative power, discussing the issue in terms of motivations, institution, transition, and results. The paper studies whether the Constitution is being carried out in a way as it is written. First, the paper discusses the impact of the interaction of occasional and unexpected factors (historical structure, cultural structure, and social structure) in various stages of Constitutional amendments on the new regulations in the Constitution. The second part of the paper discusses the dynamic process of how the new regulations in the Constitution have been implemented in reality as well as major Constitutional events. The last part of the paper discusses the result of transitions in the constitutions (A research into the facts of the power structure and relationships between the executive power and the legislative power.)

As the executive branch and the legislative branch are two main powers of a country’s politics, whether they have benign interaction has to do with the efficiency in the administration and the stability in politics. Taiwan has seven rounds of Constitutional amendments after the martial law was lifted and the period of national mobilization for suppression of the Communist rebellion was ended. The main points of the constitutional amendments focused on making adjustments to the executive power and the legislative power. The implementation of the constitution over the years had shown some flaws in the system. There are six findings of the study: the position of the central government is ambiguous; the country’s constitutional development is on track; the authority of the president is given by the Constitution; the president has power without responsibility while the premier has responsibility without power, which is against the principle of politics of responsibility; the legislative branch becomes more powerful and the executive branch has to respect the legislative power; the personal willing of the party leader who dominate the constitution amendments is the most important factor that can influence the results of the amendments. At the last part of the paper, it proposed five suggestions: to synchronize the date of election and inauguration of the legislature and the president, to develop a sound party politics, to deprive the legislature of the right to call a no-confidence vote and to deprive the executive branch of the right to dissolve the legislature, to clarify the relationships between power and responsibility of the president and the premier, to establish an absolute majority in presidential election system.

並列關鍵字

Executive Power ； Legislative Power ； Divided Government ； Unified Government ； Divisions of Power

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