Translated Titles

Internal Funds and Collateralized Borrowing in Financing Innovation





Key Words

創新融資 ; 自籌資金 ; 擔保借款 ; 流動性 ; 公開市場操作 ; 貨幣搜尋模型 ; Innovation Financing ; Internal Funds ; Collateralized Borrowing ; Liquidity ; Open Market Operation ; Money Search-theoretic Model



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Chinese Abstract

創新融資十分不易,其困難來自於創新投資計畫的不確定性 - 投入成本的不確定性及產出的不確定性。企業家可以用預先保留的內部資金進行融資,除了必須承受通膨成本,對於投入成本較高的計畫則必須放棄投資。企業家也可以向銀行借款進行外部融資,但產出的不確定性使借貸具有違約風險,而銀行需承擔債權清算的成本,此成本反映在外部融資的高利率而侵蝕企業家的利潤。對此,企業家有誘因在借貸時提供擔保品以降低債權清算的機會,進而取得較低的外部融資利率,所以可作為擔保品的資產,例如本文的政府公債,就成了持有現金以外的另一個選擇。首先,本文發現與實證相符的現象:當通貨膨脹率越高,企業家減少持有現金,從而使創新投資計畫金額下降。本文進而考慮企業家不一定能獲得外部融資機會所帶來的不確定性,政府公債的流動性因此便劣於現金央行進行公開市場操作 - 以流動性較高的現金買入流動性較差的債券時,市場資產組成產生變化使總體流動性提高,進而活絡創新投資與提升獲利,但由於可作為擔保品的債券減少,將導致實質借貸利率與債務違約風險也同步上升。

English Abstract

The difficulty of financing innovation comes from two kinds of uncertainty: the uncertain input cost and the uncertain return. An entrepreneur can overcome the uncertain input cost by accumulating massive cash in advance but bears an inflation cost. An entrepreneur can also rely on the external borrowing from the bank to finance innovation. Despite the external borrowing reduces the uncertainty of input cost and the inflation cost, the uncertain return gives the entrepreneur incentives to default. The bank suffers from the enforcement cost, which makes the external borrowing costly, once default occurs. An entrepreneur can get a lower loan rate by providing collateral to reduce the default risk of debt. Therefore, assets like the government bonds, which can be used as collateral, become another option besides cash. Both empirical data and the model in this paper suggest that a higher inflation rate reduces entrepreneur's cash holdings, and thereby decreasing the level of innovation investment. We consider the uncertainty of using external borrowing as well. When an entrepreneur uses banking service with uncertainty, bonds are equipped with less liquidity. Open market operation that replaces illiquid bonds with liquid money changes entrepreneur's portfolio composition. An entrepreneur holds more liquid cash, relies less on the external borrowing. This consequently boosts the level of innovation investment and profit, but also reduces the amount of bonds which can be used as collateral, and thereby the real loan rate and default risk rise too.

Topic Category 社會科學院 > 經濟學研究所
社會科學 > 經濟學
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