後列寧半總統制政體的憲政轉型與民主表現 外力、經濟、民族主義激蕩下的變奏： 台灣、俄羅斯、蒙古

Constitutional Transition and Democratic Performance in Post-Leninist Semi-presidential Regimes– A View of External Influence, Nationalism and Economy: Taiwan, Russia, Mongolia

官晴(Qing Guan)

指導教授 ： 吳玉山

國立臺灣大學/社會科學院/政治學研究所/碩士(2016年)

https://doi.org/10.6342/NTU201602641

摘要

本研究的主旨在於探索民主轉型與制度設計的關係，以及制度設計和民主表現的關係。具體的理論關懷則聚焦於實行列寧主義黨國體制的政體在民主轉型後為何易進入半總統制的憲政架構，以及此種憲政架構會如何切實影響到民主轉型之後的政經社運作。本文採最大近似法的比較研究邏輯，深入探討了台灣、俄羅斯、蒙古此三個後列寧個案在轉型後的半總統制制度抉擇（1990年代初期）和制度影響（2014-2016年初）上的異同。
在解釋架構與分析模型上，本文整合了既有文獻於此問題意識上的多方研究成果、集各家視角之長、發展出了一套更具全面解釋力的綜合模型。該模型含括了數對常在一般文獻中打對台的解釋途徑，如「宏觀」和「微觀」、「結構決定論」與「菁英理性選擇」、「制度性」和「非制度性」因素，並且在人的行為者因素中也同時強調了「菁英」和「民眾」兩者的作用。此套解釋架構特別強調了外力、經濟、民族主義此三個重要非制度變項的影響，解釋它們是如何通過轉化為一種社會危困局面下的民意認知、再通過政治菁英的角色與已在位的制度變項結合，形塑了半總統制的制度選擇和制度表現。
本文從台俄蒙的個案經驗中得出如下研究發現：首先在制度選擇階段，黨國體制的制度遺緒搭設了半總統制可能形成的雙軌平臺；非制度因素通過危機和民意形塑了政治菁英間的權力對比關係，而半總統制便是此種特定權力對比關係落實於憲政架構上的最終結果——危機越強、搭配上民意詮釋中越強的強人偏好，多數菁英就越佔優，半總統制中的總統相比於國會的權威就越強；危機越弱、搭配上民意詮釋中越弱的強人偏好，少數菁英就越佔優，半總統制中總統相比於國會的權威就越弱。其次，在制度影響階段，非制度因素形塑出的社會分歧和民意背景與制度上的總統權威程度共同作用，一起造成了特定的制度表現結果。
本文嘗試以個案深入來突破理論創新、以初始因素貫穿洞悉完整制度流程、聯結制度性與非制度性的分析途徑、溝通台灣和後共產國家在民主轉型與民主發展上的跨區域比較，並連結半總統制憲政體制與宏觀民主研究此兩領域的智慧，將政治制度研究與比較政治的學術主流接軌；冀望以此充實學者專家、政治實踐者和普羅大眾對民主制度之產生與運作發展的關切省思，並貢獻於新興民主國家、政治轉型與全球民主發展的時代主題。

關鍵字

政治制度 ； 半總統制 ； 民主轉型 ； 制度影響 ； 民族主義 ； 俄羅斯 ； 蒙古

並列摘要

This thesis examines the relationship between democratic transition and institutional choice, and the relationship between institutional choice and democratic performance. Theoretically, the focus is on explaining why and how the majority of post-Leninist states have chosen a semi-presidential constitutional structure after democratic transition, and how this constitutional structure tends to lead to certain political, economic and social results in the democratic consolidation period. Utilizing a “most-similar cases” strategy of comparative analysis, this study focuses on Taiwan, Russia and Mongolia, three post-Leninist semi-presidential regimes, with regard to their initial institutional choices during the early 1990s and their more recent institutional performance during the 2014-2016 period.
In seeking to explain these phenomena, this study develops a holistic theory that integrates several perspectives and analytical approaches from the existing literature. The resulting model encompasses several pairs of explanatory factors that are usually viewed as contradictory in the literature, such as “macro” versus “micro”, “structural determinism” versus “elites’ rational choice”, “institutional” versus “non-institutional” factors, and “elites” versus the “public”. In particular, the thesis highlights the causal effects of three key non-institutional variables (or structural preconditions) on both institutional choice and institutional performance: external influence, economy and nationalism.
Drawing on the experiences of Taiwan, Russia and Mongolia, the study concludes several important empirical observations. First, during the phase of initial institutional choice (the early 1990s), the Leninist institutional legacy of dual-leadership provides a structural foundation from which semi-presidentialism takes shape. Against this structural backdrop, country-specific background dynamics, including structural preconditions and intra-elite relations, as well as involvement by the public under crisis situations during democratization, led to the variation in presidential powers among the three semi-presidential regimes. As a result, stronger crises and public opinion more in favor of strongman politics lead to stronger bargaining power for pro-presidentialism elites that, in turn, results in stronger institutional power being bestowed on the president (vis-à-vis the parliament) under a semi-presidential framework. Second, in the more recent phase of institutional performance (2014-2016), the three key non-institutional variables from which particular social background and public opinion are derived, combine with the semi-presidential institutional configuration, influence democratic performance.
This study aims to achieve theoretical innovation through in-depth comparative analysis, and to leverage the perspective of “initial conditions” to gain insights into the process of institutional evolution. Through cross-regional comparison, it also aims to bridge the study of Taiwan with the experiences of post-communist countries with regard to democratic transition and democratic development, and to put the institutional study of semi-presidentialism in dialogue with the mainstream study of democracy in comparative politics. The author anticipates this study to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the issue of the constitutional design of nascent democracies and to the discussion of the overarching topics of political transformation and global democratic development.

並列關鍵字

Political Institutions ； Semi-presidentialism ； Democratic Transition ； Institutional Effects ； Nationalism ； Russia ； Mongolia

參考文獻

Levisky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Wu, Yu-Shan. 2005. “Appointing the Prime Minister under Incongruence: Taiwan in Comparison with France and Russia.” Taiwan Journal of Democracy 1(1): 103-32.

吳玉山，2009，〈解釋俄羅斯的民主倒退〉，《台灣民主季刊》，6(1)：199-205。

陳宏銘、梁元棟，2007，〈半總統制的形成和演化—台灣、法國、波蘭與芬蘭的比較研究〉，《台灣民主季刊》，4（4）：27-69。