摘要: 本文從法院參與進而主導的統合觀點出發,試圖藉由歐洲法院與會員國法院間的互動,探討法院在區域統合中,所能扮演的角色。本文,首先分析歐盟法與會員國法間的關係,以及兩個憲法秩序間的關係,並試圖剖析逐漸形成中的歐盟憲法秩序,法院在這形成過程中,所扮演的角色。其次,討論歐洲法院與會員國法院的關係,從靜態面向的考察,發現,先行裁決制度的設計,強化會員國法院與歐洲法院間司法對話的機制,進而導向歐盟法的統合。以及西歐國家,對於法治的尊重,以法院作為爭端解決的法治文化,其三則是歐洲法院長期以來司法積極的態度,這三個面向,導致歐洲法院與會員國法院,在歐盟統合過程中,扮演不可忽視的角色。 而在關於歐洲統合過程中,具有指標性之主權、最高性、補充原則三個議題,本文從德國、英國、法國三國的法治背景,制度設計探討,上開不同的法制制度,如何影響會員國法院與歐洲法院間對於上開三個議題的互動關係。進而,本文發現,就主權議題而言,德國所關心的議題在於民主正當性的要求在主權移轉予歐盟層次時,上}歐盟層次的民主正當性應如何落實。而國會如何在這主權移轉的過程中,作一明確的授權與監督,德國憲法法院並強調,德國仍然是條約的主人,對於條約之解釋及終止,具有最終決定性的發言權。而法國而言,則強調主權屬於人民全體的概念,進而引伸出主權行使的基本條件,以及主權移轉與主權限制的若干理論。而由於憲法委員會採取的是事前抽象審查的態樣,經憲法委員會認為與法國憲法抵觸者,則以修憲的方式加以解決。而就英國而言,因為傳統以來議會主權的歷史背景,使得英國在面對主權移轉這個議題時,顯得相當尷尬,當英國同意受到歐盟法的限制時,英國是否仍保有其主權國家之本質,則受到質疑。而這樣的疑問,對於英國同樣可以在最高性議題上找到佐證。英國作為一個議會主權國家,要求英國接受歐盟法的最高性,無異意味著英國長期以來後法推翻前法及默示廢棄原則的放棄,這樣的議會主權是否與加入之前的議會主權相當,是否產生根本性的影響,是英國上議院一直不願正面面對的問題,因此,英國上議院試圖以和諧解釋原則及用歐盟法之精神解釋英國法律這樣的解釋取徑迴避上開對於議會主權的直接挑戰。而就德國而言,德國所關心的議題則呈現在基本人權的重視上,這可能與德國戰後反思的法治背景有關,也可能係因為德國法院在對於歐盟法最高性的議題接受上,呈現一種垂直性的互動關係,主要是來自於下級法院藉由對於歐盟法的挑戰,試圖要求憲法法院對上開問題做一回應。而基於憲法法院的特質,德國對於最高性議題的關注點,則集中在基本人權的保障上。而法國則因其特殊之分散式法院體系,各法院間對於歐盟法最高性的議題接受上,則呈現水平競爭的狀態,最高法院破冰式的肯認歐盟法的最高性,使得行政法院不得不肯認共同體法的最高性。這可以顯現法院與法院之間的競爭關係。而就補充原則與權限分配議題上,這毋寧是歐盟法的核心議題之一,也可能係歐盟法體系崩潰的一個導火線,誚]倘若會員國法院對於歐盟法措施是否符合補充原則,是否落於歐盟權限並加以審查,這將導致歐盟法體系在會員國法院被挑戰,宣告無效,這毋寧是歐盟法體系的解體。 而本文進而討論,由上開互動過程中,法院在區域統合過程中,所能扮演的角色,以及法院應扮演怎樣的角色。基於全球化下法院與法院間的互動,本文以為香蕉訴訟由於其涉及國際貿易法層次,歐盟法層次以及德國憲法法院層次,香蕉訴訟是檢討法院在在一連串由區域統合所產生的訴訟中,最佳探討案例。本文,發現,藉由個別訴訟當事人之促進,以及法院與法院間之互動,尤其是憲法第一百條及共同體條約第一七七條之先行裁決制度,提供了法院促進及活化區域統合之重要機制。而本文,並認為,藉由法院之參與,可以將區域統合模式,導向較為規則導向而非權力導向之統合模式。
Summary: Courts, both the European Court of Justice(ECJ)and National Judiciary play an important role in the process of European legal integration. And judicial dialogue and cross-fertilization have provided an important angle to look upon the interaction between courts and courts. This thesis has chosen the judiciary in Germany, France and the United Kingdom. as well ECJ as the subject of my research since Germany and France are two of the founding members of the European Union, and have all along been playing the leading role in the European integration. United Kingdom is being chosen as a subject of this thesis is the fact that the system of law in the United Kingdom differs quite significantly to that of the continental system. The dualism of the German legal tradition and the influence of judicial review, especially the concrete constitutional review, the monism of the French legal tradition and her not-long-established constitutional review (limited to abstract one) offer a good and interesting basis for comparison. At the same time, the emphasis placed by the French on the doctrine of separation of powers and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in United Kingdom. also offer a good perspective to analyzing the reception of community law in the national judiciary. This thesis focuses on the issues of supremacy, sovereignty and subsidiarity since these three questions are some of the most important and controversial issues in European legal integration. It is submitted that these three issues are also interrelated. First, the part-transfer of sovereignty by member states to the European Communities forms mainly the legal basis of supremacy of the community law. It also forms a limit of the ambit of community law, especially from the point of popular sovereignty. Second, in order to deal with the question over the limit of community competence, we are faced with a deep-rooted question, that is, the issue of judicial Kompetenz-Kompetenz, which has to be guided by the principle of subsidiarity. By observing the interaction of ECJ and national courts on the three issues mentioned above, the author finds that ECJ plays a dominant role as the creator of supremacy doctrine and the house of Lords of United Kingdom manages to protect parliamentary sovereignty and French constitutional council can been described as the guardian of national sovereignty whereas German Federal Constitutional Court acts as the guardian of human rights and democratic staticism. This thesis goes further to discuss the Banana saga as an example to present the interaction of ECJ and Germany Federal Constitutional Court and German Administrative Court and tries to analyze the role played by judiciary and private litigants